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MARGINS
A CHANGE 
OF HEART?
What are we to 
make of Fightback 
II? In terms of pure 
politics, the revised 
package was 
designed to restore 
the Opposition's 
electoral fortunes, 
which towards the 
end of last year 
were clearly 
flagging. It was also 
designed to counter 
the wide 
recognition that, 
whatever one 
thought of its 
merits in the long 
term, implementing 
Fightback I would be 
disastrous for an 
economy 
undergoing a 
relatively slow and 
fragile recovery 
from recession.
A
 more fundamental issue is 
the significance of Fight­
back II to the Opposition’s 
broad ideological position. 
Does it signify that the federal 
Opposition has, belatedly, 
joined the move away from 
the small-govemment ideol­
ogy of the 80s?
Obviously, as a federal 
minister committed to the re- 
election of the present gov­
ernment, I can’t claim to speak 
on any of these issues as a 
disinterested party. So this is 
an admittedly partisan critique 
of the Opposition’s latest ef­
fort and its significance.
Theheartofborh Fightback 
I and II has been the introduc­
tion of a broadly-based goods 
and services tax. In response 
to criticism from a wide range 
of community organisations, 
the Opposition decided to re­
move basic foodstuffs from the 
ambit of the tax. While po­
litically advantageous, this 
does not overcome the funda­
mental objections to the GST. 
Excluding food reduces the 
annual revenue from the GST 
from $27 billion to the still 
huge sum of $22 billion. In 
terms of macroeconomic im­
pact, there is not much change 
from the original package. 
There is a consensus among 
economists that, at least for 
the next few years, the intro­
duction of a GST of this mag­
nitude would depress eco­
nomic activity and employ­
ment, and lead to higher in­
flation and interest rates.
The basic problem is that, 
in the absence of an effective 
incomes policy like the Ac­
cord, a Coalition government 
would have no option but to 
run a very tight monetary 
policy to avoid the price-hike 
induced by the GST generat­
ing an inflationary spiral. This 
has been the overwhelming 
experience from countries that 
have introduced such taxes. 
New Zealand, for example, 
had to endure five years of 
near-zero growth after intro­
ducing such a tax.
The revised package con­
tains a commitment to spend 
several billion dollars on ma­
jor infrastructure. In this re­
spect, the Coalition could be 
seen to be following the gov­
ernment’s broad direction in 
the One Nation statement, 
which included a multi-bil- 
lion dollar public infrastruc­
ture program. There is no 
doubt that neglecting public 
infrastructure is a false 
economy. There is strong evi­
dence from studies of the US 
in the 1980s that the starving 
ofpublic infrastructure invest­
ment by the Reagan and Bush 
administrations exacted a 
heavy price in terms of poor 
productivity growth.
The problem is that this 
increased infrastructure in­
vestment is supposed to be 
funded by a massive program 
of privatisation, particularly 
the sale of Telecom. Most 
economists, conventional or 
otherwise, acknowledge that 
to use the proceeds of privati- 
sation to fund increased 
spending in other areas in­
volves a sleight of hand, since 
the macroeconomic effects of 
placing a given volume ofpub­
lic enterprise equities on the 
capital market are essentially 
the same as if the government 
borrowed to fund these ex­
penditures.
The sheer scale of the pro­
posed public asset selloff is 
remarkable. The sale of 
Telecom alone will involve 
putting $10 billion worth of 
equities on the capital market 
for two consecutive years. The 
total value of the private mar­
ket for equities in Australia 
today is around $13 billion 
per annum. There is no doubt 
that privatisation on this scale 
would degenerate into a fire 
sale of public assets, to the 
great detriment of the Aus­
tralian public.
Fightback II retains the 
massive cuts to public spend­
ing announced in the original 
package. The big losers from 
this would be those most de­
pendent on various ‘social 
wage’ expenditures. These in­
clude labour market programs, 
which are designed to provide 
the unemployed with a vari­
ety of training and work expe­
rience opportunities to en­
hance their employment pros­
pects. This is a particularly 
insidious aspect of Opposition 
policy, which their spokesper­
sons seek to disguise by carica­
turing such programs as "paint­
ing rocks white”.
In fact, these programs are 
demonstrably effective, par­
ticularly for the long-term un­
employed and people suffer­
ing various forms of disadvan­
tage. Their effectiveness is 
attested to by international 
studies and rigorous evalua­
tions carried out locally by the 
Department of Employment, 
Education and Training. That 
they have a crucial role to play 
in preventing the entrench­
ment of long-term unemploy­
ment as a permanent feature 
of society is conceded even by 
‘dry’ economic commentators 
such as The Australian’s PP 
McGuinness.
The revision of Fightback! 
does not signify any funda­
mental ideological sh ift on the 
part of the Opposition—a 
point they have been at pains 
to stress. It does indicate a 
response to the notable hard­
ening in public perceptions of 
the impact of dry economic 
policies. To be seen as a doc­
trinaire ‘economic rationalist’ 
is increasingly an electoral kiss 
of death. The public expects 
governments to respond to the 
recession with stimulatory 
policies, and is supportive of 
increased public spending on 
crucial infrastructure and the 
education and trainingsystem. 
It also expects governments 
to act to ensure that large num­
bers of people aren’t left be­
hind as economic recovery 
gathers pace. B
p e te r  Ba l d w in  is the
federal minister for Higher 
Education and Employment 
Services.
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B audelaire’s words from Poor Belgium could have 
been written for Canberra, at 
least as far as the first lack 
goes. There are virtually no 
good cheap restaurants in 
Canberra, despite local gov­
ernment propaganda to the 
contrary, which boasts that 
the ACT has the highest ra­
tio of restaurants per head of 
population in Australia. All 
of them are frequented, I sus­
pect, by unfortunate souls 
being dragged around the 
Mint and the War Memorial. 
Apart from the central busi­
ness district, still called Civic, 
all shops and restaurants here 
in the ACT must be confined 
to small areas marked down 
for ‘shops’, lest a cafe des­
ecrate Anzac Avenue, or 
even, God help us, a sushi bar 
spring up next to the eternal 
flame as if to mock our war 
dead by the preparation of 
cool uncooked fish.
This means that each lit­
tle shopping centre has one 
or two restaurants. There are 
at least five in Dickson which 
makes my suburb of residence 
pretty damn urban, let me 
tell you. There is even a 
McDonalds in Dickson which 
explains the saddest bumper 
sticker 1 have everseen: ‘Time 
for a McDonalds in Civic”. 
This is the real Canberra, dear 
reader, as opposed to the ex­
citing one on the news.
I reached the nadir of my 
culinary experiences recently 
in a restaurant in a shopping 
precinct on the south side of 
this fair town. I ordered anti- 
pasto in an Italian restaurant 
and was served one type of 
meat with Jatz biscuits. Not 
very misco, I thought to my­
self. I was charged $9. But 
why try to improve things? 
The lack of competition al­
lows for such appalling be­
haviour, and the average 
Canberra resident only argues 
about policy, not important 
things like food.
I have taken Baudelaire’s
advice, at least as far as the 
cookbooks go. The Women’s 
Cookbook (Heinemann) con­
tains a useful recipe for 
Grissini—which, for the ben­
efit of the restaurant discussed 
above, are cylindrical Jatz bis­
cuits, otherwise known as 
breadsticks. This book, re­
leased last year, commemo­
rates a fundraising dinnerheld 
for The Victorian Women’s 
Trust where chefs donated 
theirskills toproduce food for 
800 guests. Many of the reci­
pes are worth having and the 
book looks particularly attrac­
tive, being interspersed with 
paintings of women artists 
from the turn of the century 
and superb photographs of 
food by Bobbi Fabian.
The Women's Cookbook is 
intended as a celebration of 
women’s creativity and is 
dedicated to the women of 
Australia. “Through your 
cooking, may you experience 
the pleasures and joy of shar­
ing, comfort, nature, celebra­
tion, and friendship." And 
may you also enjoy eating and 
being served, 1 would add. The 
fine line between celebrating 
women’s creativity and cel­
ebrating unreconstructed no­
tions of feminine activity is 
highlighted by this book.
Marion Halligan’s fore­
word touches briefly on the 
ways that women’s work as 
preparers of food has rarely 
been acknowledged in the 
way men’s work in the*culi- 
nary world has. Marieke 
Brugman, the convenor of the 
Women’s Trust, sees the reci­
pes in the book as a celebra­
tion of cooking in the Aus­
tralian context which, for her, 
lacks “the constraints of her­
itage and tradition that bind 
older societies”. A strange 
comment, given the variety 
of culinary traditions drawn 
on in the book. The Women’s 
Cookbook is well worth hav­
ing because the recipes are 
lovely. However, I would 
have liked a little more em­
phasis in the accompanying 
essays on the role of The 
Women’s Trust in improving 
the position of women in so­
ciety, rather than this con­
stant assertion of ‘celebra­
tion’. This easy term tends to 
question the need for an or­
ganisation such as The Trust 
in the first place. Either this 
or no essays at all, and more 
photos.
One thing I have to say 
for Canberra is that avocados 
are very cheap here. 1 was 
horrified when I first arrived 
to see flies in the fruit shops, 
hovering over the merchan­
dise, and I was equally shocked 
to find that suspect groceries 
from other states were 
dumped here because there 
were no ‘use-by’ date rules 
until recently. And food is 
generally dearer here than 
down South. But avocados 
are an exception, so I was 
pleased to pick up a second­
hand copy of A Glut of Avo­
cados by Ann Carr(Merehurst 
Press).
The obsessive cookbook 
is a genre I love; it takes one 
item of food and does more 
things with it than had ever 
occurred to the innocent 
mind. Avocados, it seems, are 
not only good as dips and 
soup, but in sweet dishes too. 
I have yet to pluck up the 
courage to attempt Avocado 
Custard which even the ob­
sessed Ms Carr warns is for 
the adventurous, but 1 may 
yet, given that outside it is 
Jatz or McDonalds. And with 
these cookbooks, and remem­
bering past repasts, I have 
been almost coping with 
Kafkaland—which I now 
think of as Little Belgium, 
ACT. ■
Penelope Cottier.
M O V E A B L E
F E A S T
BORING
UTTLE
BELGIUM
"No restaurants? 
Read a cookbook. 
No mistress? Read 
a novel about 
love."
PROFILE
TINTIN
Belgium's most 
famous journalist 
celebrates his 65th 
birthday this year: 
the boy reporter 
was created by 
Georges Reml, a 
young Belgian 
graphic artist, late 
In 1928. Yet llntin 
can lay even more 
of a claim than 
most cartoon 
characters to a 
certain 
agelessness.
A
ll we really know about 
him is that he’s a reporter. 
He never mentions a mother 
or father—he doesn’t even 
have a surname. Nor do ro­
mance, domestic trivialities 
or daily hack work intrude in 
any way on his jet-setting ex­
istence.
One can only gue ss at how 
the other, more conventional 
journalists on the Belgian 
Catholic newspaper Le XXe 
Siecle (The 20 th Century) felt 
about this newcomer to their 
ranks. But then, only the most 
adventurous of them would 
have envied him his first as­
signment— in the stories that 
were eventually published as 
Tin tin Au Pays des Soviets 
(Tintin In The Land of the 
Soviets), the young adven­
turer was frozen in ice, nar­
rowly escaped drowning in a 
dungeon and faced a firing 
squad, all in the name of ex­
posing the villainy of the 
young Soviet state.
Remi (who signed his 
drawings Herg£), had of 
course never been to the 
USSR. In fact, he took his 
vision of the Soviet Union 
wholesale from Joseph 
Douillet’s Moscou Sans Voiles 
(Moscow Unveiled). In this 
and the second Tintin ad­
venture, Tintin Au Congo, he 
took his cues and his views 
from his employers at Le XXe 
Siecle. Tintin’s Congo adven­
ture is high on slapstick and 
very low on everything else. 
Herg£, like most Belgians, had 
no idea of his country’s hor­
rific exploitation of its over­
sized colony. Tintin moves 
among the carefree and lazy 
Congolese as if he were wan­
dering around a toyshop.
Herg£’s professed naive 
did not seem to have under­
gone much of a revision even 
by the time he colourised and 
‘updated’ this adventure in 
1946. Where in the original 
story Tintin plays school­
teacher to four black boys and 
draws them a picture of Bel­
gium (“votre patrie”), the 
current version sees him ask­
ing them to add two and two, 
to which he receives only the 
most stupefied blank stares. 
It’s hardly surprising that these 
first two Tintin adventures 
have yet to be given the mass- 
market treatment of other 
works.
Hergg began hitting his 
stride—and making a belated 
attempt to redress the politi­
cal balance—with his third 
Tintin adventure, Tintin En 
Amerique {Tintin in America). 
Readers were surprised to find 
depictions of white cruelty 
towards native Americans; 
and had At Capone had a 
knowledge of French he 
might have been surprised to 
find himself captured at gun­
point by the young reporter.
Tintin had by now be­
come a national hero in Bel­
gium, largely because his was 
the first locally-produced 
comic strip. Les Cigares du 
Pharaon (Cigars of the Pharoah) 
and Le Lotus Bleu (The Blue 
Lotus) followed. Herg£ aban­
doned the slapdash style of 
thefirstTintinadventuresand 
began to give hundreds of 
hours to researching and de- 
velopinghis stories. IfTintin’s 
readers were shocked at see­
ing American Indians— ‘bad 
guys’—portrayed as victims 
in Tintin in America, they 
must have been amazed to 
see the Mukden railway inci­
dent—which sparked off the 
Sino-Japanese War— told 
from China’s point of view in 
Le Lotus Bleu. Hergg had 
found a valuable source—a 
Chinese student studying in 
Brussels. Chang Chon-Chen 
not only set him straight about 
Chinese customs and culture 
but also furnished Herg£ with 
anti-Japanese slogans in Chi­
nese characters for the back­
grounds to Tintin’s adven­
tures.
Sadly, while Herg^ devel­
oped and expanded his out­
look, Tintin stayed resolutely
the same. If anything, he be­
came less of a personality and 
more of a straight man to the 
cast of eccentric characters 
with which Herg£ began fill­
ing his stories. First came 
Dupont and Dupond, the de­
tectives, (translated into Eng­
lish as Thompson and 
Thomson). Identically idi­
otic, the two were always ea­
ger to arrest Tintin—or, al­
ternatively, to embrace him 
as an old friend. The drunken 
and gruff Captain Haddock, 
the deaf and alternately bril­
liant/hopeless scientist Pro­
fessor Calculus (Toumesol in 
the original) and the aggres­
sive and condescending Mad­
ame Castafiore were all to be 
added to the Herg£ gallery in 
ensuing years. But while 
Tintin is always cunning and 
brave, he remains a hero i$ 
the true Mickey Mouse tradi­
tion: too popular, righteous 
and sensible to have a real 
personality.
In the 1938 Le Sceptre 
d’Ottokar (King Ottakar's 
Sceptre) Hergg brought his 
political satire closertohome, 
as Tintin travelled to the ru­
ral Balkanesque monarchy of 
Syldavia, under threat from 
the evil dictator Musstler. It 
is ironic, then, that less than 
three years later Hergg and 
Tintin would be working— 
in a manner of speaking—for 
Hitler.
Once again, Herg6 
claimed political naivety and 
innocent neutrality: he had 
fled Belgium as the Nazis 
moved in, then returned to 
tough it out as a loyal subject 
of Leopold III. Tintin, mean­
while, embarked on a trip to 
find a bizarre meteorite that 
almost destroyed the world. 
Here he was competing with 
a group of unscrupulous 
American explorers funded 
by a businessman named 
Bohlwinkel (Hergg claimed 
to be unaware this was a dis­
tinctively Jewish surname). 
In later versions of L’Etoile
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M ysterieuse (The Shooting 
Star), the explorers became 
citizens of the mythical state « 
of Sao Rico, but the dam­
age— to both Hergg and 
T intin— had been done. 
When Belgium was liberated 
in 1944, they were out in the 
cold for years.
However, it wouldn’t 
have been possible to keep a 
journalist as popular or as 
gung-ho as young Tintin 
blacklisted forever, no mat­
ter what his collaborationist 
crimes may have been. In 
1950 he embarked on his 
moon adventure, which was 
depicted with astonishing at­
tention to technical detail 
(the only scientifically inac­
curate fact of the voyage is 
the inclusion of a patently 
unfit, temperamental alco­
holic such as Haddock among 
the spaceship’s crew).
Cold War intrigue was the 
theme of the 1956 L'Affaire 
Toumesol (The Calculus Af­
fair). Having experimented 
with a number of dotty pro­
fessors, Hergg finally found 
one who suited him to a tee. 
Calculus is just as comfort­
able inventing machines to 
destroy whole cities as he is 
propagating a new rose in 
honour of the opera singer 
Castafiore. The high regard 
in which Tintin and Had­
dock hold the professor seems
not at all tempered by the 
fact that he is resolutely un­
able to understand anything 
they say to him.
Tintin’s adventures con­
tinued throughout the 60s, 
ultimately grinding to a halt 
with the ill-conceived Tintm 
et Les Picaros (Tiium and the 
Picaros) in 1975. Remarkably, 
Tintin abandoned his regula­
tion plus-fours for a pair of 
jeans, and even acquired a 
peace sign on his motorbike 
helmet—all to no avail. But 
if Tintin failed to come to 
terms with the 70s, Hergg’s 
clear line drawing style and 
technical excellence have as- ' 
sured him a life far beyond 
his creator’s. Herg£died 
in 1983, and his es­
tate has allowed
Tintin to k*ep going in a 
much less demanding sphere 
of the market; the merchan­
dising of cups, stationery, t- 
shirts and other parapherna­
lia has spread Tintin’s image 
far beyond the bookshelves 
of children and intelligent 
adults.
The French, who give 
comics the respect they de­
serve and then some, have 
cultivated Tintinism above 
and beyond the call of duty. 
Briton Harry Thompson has 
finally done the decent thing 
for English-speaking Tintin 
fans and produced a small vol­
ume called Tintin: Herg( and 
his Creation (Sceptre, 
$14 95) which has all 
the facts and a lit­
tle too much flip­
pancy, perhaps to counter­
balance the academic earnest­
ness with which the French- 
speaking world treats the sub­
ject. Somewhere along the 
line.it seems, Thompson fell 
foul of Herg£’s estate. He was 
unable to reproduce any im­
age of Tintin except for one 
which used on a Belgian 
stamp. Benoit Peeters’ Tintin 
and the World of Hergi 
(Methuen, $39.95), however, 
was prepared with the assist­
ance of the Herg£ Founda­
tion. It contains many fasci­
nating illustrations, as well as 
a lot of garbled English, but 
glosses over various sensitive 
points which Hergg’s succes­
sors couldn’t stomach in 
Thompson’s book.
What of Herg6 himself? 11 
seems that while Tintin was 
having all the fun, adventure 
and cameraderie, this talented 
and meticulous lapsed Catho­
lic suffered all his life for his 
creation. Tintin caused him 
nervous breakdowns and de­
pression. During his most suc­
cessful period after the war 
(which itself brought on a 
plague of boils), Hergg devel­
oped appalling eczema on his 
hands whenever he began 
work on a new story. No won­
der that towards the end of 
his life he often professed to 
hate Tintin passionately—  
except in lighter moments, 
when he was simply horribly 
bored by him.
Perhaps it’s only right, 
then, that Herg£ died with­
out finishing his last story, 
Tintin et L'Alph'Art, leaving 
Tintin in yet another tight 
comer—about to be cast in 
plastic by a gang of ruthless 
art forgers. Georges Remi’s 
widow and estate elected to 
leave him there, and the book 
was never completed. For 
someone who never percep­
tibly aged a day in sixty-five 
years, it seems fitting. ■
DAV ID  NICHOLS writes 
for teen magazines.
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Operation Restore 
Hope, the American- 
led mission aimed at 
relieving starvation 
in Somalia, is just the 
latest example of 
what has come to be 
known as 
humanitarian 
intervention.
HUNGRY FOR 
INTERVENTION
O
ther recent examples are the al­
lied action to protect the Kurds 
in Iraq at the end of the Gulf 
War and the relief missions presently 
being mounted in the old Yugoslavia. 
They are significant in that they are 
multilateral in character; though only 
a relatively small number of countries 
have been involved, the operations 
have had the backing and endorse- 
ment of the United Nations. Other 
recent cases of intervention where a 
concern for human rights has been a 
significant, if not exclusive motiva­
tion, have been unilateral. These have 
included: India’s invasion of East Pa­
kistan in 1971—an action which 
stopped the killing of Bengalis; Viet­
nam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978; 
Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda in 19 79 
which resulted in the removal of Idi 
Amin; and the French action in the 
Central African Empire in 1979 which 
ousted Emperor Bokassa.
The concept of humanitarian in­
tervention is by no means new. A 
provision for intervention on behalf 
of those suffering under tyranny was 
recognised by the founders of the 
modem sovereign state system. It re­
ceived further attention in the 19th 
century, though the notion of hu­
manitarian intervention was then of­
ten used to rationalise the imperial 
designs of the European powers.
But in the latter part of the 20th 
century, the idea has come of age, for 
two reasons: improved global com­
munications have made people more 
aware of human rights abuses in vari­
ous parts of the world, and the promo­
tion of human rights has become an 
increasingly important item on the 
agendaof international relations. The 
latter development has been rein­
forced by a relative decline in the 
importance of security issues in the 
post-Cold War era; by the almost 
missionary zeal with which the devel­
oped democracies, in the wake of the
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collapse of communism, have sought 
to promote human rights; and by the 
increasingly active role of the United 
Nations.
The principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention are central to the 
modem state system and the United 
Nations is pledged to uphold them. 
But the UN is also pledged to uphold 
the peace, and this has led to the view 
that the UN has a right to intervene 
militarily in situations where the abuse 
of human rights in a particular coun­
try threatens international peace— 
most commonly by causing a flow of 
refugees across international borders. 
This was the argument used by the 
UN to justify its intervention in Iraq 
to protect the Kurds. The argument 
would seem to apply even more so in 
the case of the former Yugoslavia. 
Any further intervention there will 
have a lot to do with concern that a 
continuation of‘ethnic cleansing’and 
other atrocities in the Balkans might 
send a flood of refugees into western 
and southern Europe with obvious 
consequences for the peace and sta­
bility of the region.
The operation in Somalia was jus­
tified not on the grounds that the 
situation there constituted a poten­
tial threat to international security, 
but rather on the grounds of relieving 
the appalling suffering of the Somali 
people in circumstances where all 
semblances of national government 
had broken down. The action repre­
sents a watershed in the UN’s attitude 
to intervention— it is the first time 
the world body has regarded the relief 
of suffering as a primary justification 
for overriding the principles of sover­
eignty and non-intervention.
These developments have raised 
a number of important political and 
military issues. First, there is the ques­
tion of the composition and com­
mand of the forces engaged in hu­
manitarian intervention. The opera­
tion in Somalia has the endorsement 
of the UN and the forces involved 
come from a number of nations, in­
cluding Australia. However, the force 
is overwhelmingly American and is 
commanded by an American— 
though he is required to liaise more 
closely with the Security Council than 
did his counterpart during the Gulf
War. Elements on the Left have long 
been sceptical, often to the point of 
paranoia, about US intentions, and 
the predominantly American charac­
ter of the operation in Somalia fuels 
suspicion that it is little more than an 
extension of US foreign policy.
Such concerns might be allayed if 
the UN was seen to be more obviously 
in control. Operations like the one in 
Somalia could be placed under the 
control of the Military Staff Commit­
tee of the Security Council, as pro­
vided for in the UN Charter. Another 
possibility, which has been pushed 
recently by Secretary General Boutros- 
Ghali, is that the UN create a special 
standing army, made up of contin­
gents from as many member states as 
possible, which could be used to en­
force directives of the Security Coun­
cil. But these proposals are not likely 
to gain easy acceptance. For the fore­
seeable future, operations like the one 
in Somalia, if they are to go ahead at 
all, are likely to have a significant 
American component.
Second, the Somalia operation 
raises questions about the legitimacy 
of the UN itself. Many Third World 
states are dissatisfied with a situation 
where so much power is vested in a 
small number of predominantly Euro­
pean countries—the victors of a war 
fought more than 50 years ago. They 
would like to see reforms in the struc­
ture of the UN such as an expansion of 
the permanent membership of the 
Security Council and the General 
Assembly. These concerns will have 
to be addressed if there is to be suffi­
cient support for any long-term ex­
pansion of the UN’s role in humani­
tarian intervention.
Third, reference to this sort of 
intervention as ‘humanitarian’ should 
not be allowed to disguise its military 
character. Opposition to the Ameri­
can presence in Somalia has been 
minimal, but this case could prove to 
be the exception rather than the rule. 
A more 1 ikely scenario is one in which 
starvation and human rights abuses 
are a product of widespread and or­
ganised civil strife. In such situations, 
intervention would almost inevitably 
involve taking sides in the conflict 
and perhaps determining the outcome. 
At the very least this could entail a
longer than expected involvement for , 
the intervening force.
Even in Somalia, this remains a 
possibility. The US originally had ex­
pected to be able to quit the country 
by the time of the Clinton Inaugura­
tion. The intention had been to re­
place the Americans with a UN force 
of some sort, but this isprovinghard to 
organise. Washington may eventu­
ally be faced with the choice of either 
withdrawing from Somalia before the 
objectives of the intervention have 
been achieved or hanging on indefi­
nitely. In any case, those who have 
argued that military intervention is 
an inappropriate and counterproduc­
tive means of dealing with human 
rights abuses will feel vindicated.
Recourse to the use of force in 
support of humanitarian intervention 
is likely to prove a major sticking 
point on the Left. At the time of the 
Gulf War many on the Left, especially 
in the federal parliamentary Labor 
Party, were persuaded to abandon their 
opposition to the use of force because 
the allied operation had the endorse­
ment of the UN. But dissenters re­
mained, and these same people could 
be expected to oppose the use of force 
in support of humanitarian interven­
tion.
When confronted with pitiful im­
ages like those beamed out of Soma­
lia, only the most insensitive among 
us could deny having wished that some 
international means were at hand to 
relieve the situation. This is not to 
deny that problems exist with the 
concept of humanitarian intervention. 
But the easy option—one which some 
on the Left seem to support— is to 
deny that there are any circumstances 
in which intervention, even with hu­
manitarian objectives, is justified. 
Such a stand would sit uneasily with 
traditional Left thinking about inter­
national relations. The Left has a long 
and proud record of support for just 
causes in many parts of the world and 
this has often included support for 
armed struggle. The Left should sup­
port the intervention in Somalia. ■
BOB HOW ARD is the editor of the 
Current Affairs Bulletin, and teaches 
in government at Sydney Univer­
sity.
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BLUE VELVET
The 1989 Velvet Revolution and its personal symbol, 
the playwright Vaclav Havel, embodied all that was 
democratic and liberal in the Czech character.
A
mong its former eastern bloc 
neighbours, the Czech lands 
seemed best situated to make a 
successful jump to a society and 
economy close to the western Euro­
pean model.The post-communist 
Czecho-Slovak Federal Republic 
(CSFR) was unique among countries 
in the region in being able tocall upon 
the legacy of a democratic interwar 
republic which survived as a working 
parliamentary democracy until Ger­
man troops snuffed it out in 1938.
On the streets of Prague and 
Bratislava in 1989, the Czechs and 
Slovaks seemed in unanimous con­
sent with the dissidents’ starry vision 
of Czechoslovakia’s future. It was not 
long after those euphoric days, how­
ever, that another side of the Czech 
character also showed itsface. Though 
the average Czech detested the com­
munist system, it was only a tiny mi­
nority of dissident intellectuals who, 
under the dictatorship, had defiantly 
defended the ideals of civil society.
The past three years have pre­
sented a much more diverse picture of 
Czech and Slovak society. The party 
of the former Charter 77 dissidents 
failed even to reach the 5% hurdle 
necessary for parliamentary represen­
tation in last year’s elections. Their 
loss illustrated all too vividly the
schisms between the dissident and the 
average person, the emigre and the 
local, the intellectual and the worker, 
the 1968 Prague Spring generation 
and those who had never hoped for 
anything more than a telephone, a 
flat and a car.
The first signs that all was not well 
surfaced in April and May 1990 when 
a wave of rightwing violence against 
Gypsies and Vietnamese workers cap­
tured headlines in northern Boherpia. 
In northern industrial cities, racist 
Czech skinheads and a confused hy­
brid of Nazi-Punks set upon unarmed 
Gypsies with chains and iron bars. 
Simultaneously, skinheads vigorously 
intensified their campaign against 
Czechoslovakia’s foreign workers, the 
majority of whom are Vietnamese. 
On 1 May 1990,200 skinheads raised 
havoc in central Prague, turning on a 
Canadian tourist group after beating 
up the Gypsies and Vietnamese on 
the main square.
Havel responded immediately to 
the violence, echoing widespread ru­
mours at the time that disillusioned 
elements of the old apparatus, par­
ticularly the security forces, stood be­
hind it. Racial tensions and ethnic 
animosity, however, existed in the 
Czech lands long before the dictator­
ship’s frontmen lost their jobs. It was
while Havel pondered the human 
condition from behind bars in the 
mid-1980s that an underground world 
of neonazi and skinhead hate culture 
found an audience in Prague. By 1987 
or 1988 any tourist could see skinheads 
at cafe in the Prague Old Town. At 
beerhalls they openly fraternised with 
German and Austrian skinheads. Un­
derground heavy metal bands, such as 
the notorious group Orlik, stirred ha­
tred against punks, Gypsies, foreign 
workers, Third World students, 
Slovaks and tourists.
In the revolution’s aftermath, le­
gal Orlik concerts drew as many as 600 
skinheads. Their stage sets displayed 
full-size colour posters of Miroslav 
Sladek, the leaderof the newly-formed 
ultra-rightwing Republican Party. By
1992, experts estimated that there 
were about 1,000 active skins in 
Prague, 500 in Pilzen and roughly
2,000 more scattered throughout 
northern Bohemia. On 24 November
1991, as many as 1,000 assorted 
rightwing hooligans marched through 
Prague’s Wenceslas Square to cries of 
“Gypsies O ut!’’, “Czech for the 
Czechs” and “Gypsies to the gas cham­
bers!”. Police intervened only to stop 
scuffles between the rightwingers and 
a 400-strong counter-demonstration 
of Gypsies and anarchists.
The march wove its way in and 
out of several Gypsy neighbourhoods 
until police disbanded it four hours 
later. “If this crowd had been any 
larger,” said Prague’s Deputy Chief of 
Police at the time, "we would have 
needed water cannons and tear gas.” 
But since December 1989, he noted, 
such means were no longer at his 
disposal.
The fact that Czechoslovakia’s 
guest workers were among the first 
targets of skinhead terror came as lit­
tle surprise to the victims themselves. 
In the late 1970s the Vietnamese gov­
ernment offered the services of its 
workers to the short-handed Czech 
economy to help pay off debts it had 
accrued during the war years. From 
the moment that they landed at the 
Prague airport, the Vietnamese work­
ers had no illusions as to theirpurpose; 
they were the form of value in a primi­
tive process of barter. The guest work­
ers received only the barest language
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training and a thin introduction to 
Czech society. Theirfamilies and chil­
dren were forbidden to join them. 
The state put the Vietnamese to work 
at the most menial of jobs and 
promptly forgot about them.
According to Uyen Phem Huu, a 
30-year-old Vietnamese computer 
engineerwhohas lived in Prague since 
1980, discrimination under commu­
nist rule took more subtle forms than 
it does today. “At that time, people 
couldn’t afford to hit someone in the 
streets. Often you just wouldn’t be 
served in a restaurant or something 
like that. But that was one thing. Now 
there’s democracy and that means 
they can hit whoever they want and 
get away with it.”
A problem more deeply embed­
ded in Czech culture, however, is that 
of the Gypsies. As in other central 
and eastern European countries, the
500,000 to 600,000 Gypsies in the 
Czech lands and Slovakia are the poor­
est, least educated and most discrimi­
nated against part of the population. 
In one opinion poll, 91% of Czechs 
and Slovaks expressed negative feel­
ings toward Gypsies. Since Nazi meas­
ures during the war claimed the lives 
of almost all of the Bohemian and 
Moravian Gypsies, most of those in 
the Czech lands today are Slovak 
Gypsies, sent there after the postwar 
expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.
Communist policies, though mak­
ing dents in chronic problems such as 
substandard housing and illiteracy, 
perpetuated and institutionalised the 
racial prejudices that flourished prior 
to World War Two. The regime 
treated the minority as a genetically 
inferior, second class people, with a 
worthless culture. It tried to extermi­
nate the unique Gypsy identity by 
forcibly sterilising women, suppress­
ing Gypsy language and traditions, 
liquidating rural settlements and out­
lawing nomadic wandering.
Unlike its eastern European rela­
tions, Czech “beer hall nationalism" 
centres not around issues of territorial 
expansion, religious identification, 
national independence or ethnic kin 
outside its borders. More along the 
lines of western Europe’s new Right 
culture, it plays primarily upon the 
racial prejudices and economic anxi­
eties of the lower and middle classes.
As economic cond it ions worsened 
and criminality sky-rocketed, the Gyp­
sies in the polluted, industrial waste­
lands of northern Bohemia found 
themselves the most convenient 
scapegoats for popular frustration. 
Journalists from northern Bohemian 
cities tell of “running race wars” be­
tween Czechs and Gypsies.
By mid-1991 that hostility had 
come back to its source— the average 
burgher. According to Charles Uni­
versity sociologist VaclavTrojan, “the 
first violence was a barometer of deeper 
social tensions within society”. The 
former dissident argues that these feel­
ings “had been building up for years, 
and then finally got the signal to ex­
plode”. Police forces have come un­
der heavy pressure to crack down on 
Gypsies, or at least to allow the 
skinheads to do the dirty work for 
them. “Local communities have 
shown clear popular support for the 
pogroms, for the skins and for the 
police,” says Trojan.
The political manifestation of that 
hatred is the Republican Party which 
soared from obscurity onto the 
Czechoslovak political stage last sum­
mer. Their spectacular election gain 
was one of the most painful of the 
many kicks that Czech democrats took 
in 1992. The Republicans marched 
into the legislature with over 5% of 
the total Czech vote.
Until thejune 1992 elections, the 
crude Czech nationalism of the Re­
publican Party had found an ear only 
on the streets. From early on, party 
president Sladek aimed his demagogic 
message at the disillusioned and dis­
placed in Czech society. In those first 
blissful days of new freedom and 
dreams of free market prosperity, 
Sladek’s angry appeal found resonance 
almost exclusively among skinheads 
and their sympathisers.
The clean-cut 3 5 year-old bureau - 
crat-tumed-politician openly courted 
the young militants, posing the Re­
publicans as the party for social secu­
rity and law and order. His pre-De- 
cember 1989 post as a small-time cen­
sor in the official Central Bureau for 
Press and Information didn’t faze the 
young thugs. More important to them 
was the Republicans’ early demand to
expel all Vietnamese and Cuban guest 
workers from Czechoslovakia.
As the revolution began to lose its 
glitter, Sladek tirelessly traversed the 
country, painting an opaque picture 
of society in which conspiracy and 
impenetrable networks stacked the 
deck against ordinary citizens. While 
Civic Forum’s leadership made policy 
from on high in Prague Castle, he 
peddled his message to the people. At 
aggressive, highly charged demonstra­
tions, he railed against the “commu­
nist agents” in Civic Forum, against 
the secret police “staged” revolution 
and against “Gypsy criminality”. 
Among the Republicans’ foremost 
demands is a full purge and ban on all 
former members of the communist 
party from official positions.
As Sladek’s star seemed to be ris­
ing in 1990, he tried to distance him­
self from hisjack-booted shocktroops. 
But the issues with which he had first 
won the skins’ hearts remained cen­
tral to the Republicans’ agenda. In its 
program, the party vaguely mentions 
its intention “to solve the problem of 
the Gypsies by resettling them”. In 
standard central European phraseol­
ogy, “resettling” tends to be a diplo­
matic term for expulsion, in this case 
sending the Slovak Gypsy populations 
in Bohemia and Moravia back to 
Slovakia.
According to Klara Samkova of 
the Gypsy Civic Initiative (GCI), a 
Prague-based political party, the Re­
publicans’ proposals “v iolate j ust about 
every international statute on human 
rights that exists”. That fact, how­
ever, doesn’t bother the Republicans. 
To the contrary, “Sladek is in parlia­
ment today because of his hateful 
rhetoric against Gypsies,” says 
Samkova.
The Republicans, not surprisingly, 
scored their biggest victories in north­
ern Bohemia—also the site of even 
stronger showings from the reform 
communist party. The ultra-right and 
the Left Bloc took big constituencies 
from the democratic parties by argu­
ing against full-speed ahead privatisa­
tion and the dismantling of social 
services. Sladek’s populism found an 
audience in the lower and middle 
classes, disproportionately among 
working class men in their 20s.
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The simple presence of the Re­
publicans in the Czech legislature con­
tributes to the drastically overhauled 
face of Czech politics in the aftermath 
of the 1992 elections. Along with the 
formerCharter 77 dissidents, any talk 
of civil society and expanded forms of 
democracy has vanished from politi­
cal discourse. The monetarists of 
Vaclav Klaus’Civic Democratic Party 
(CDP) dominate parliament. Follow­
ing the recent dissolution of Czecho­
slovakia human rights activists in the 
Czech Republic fear that the govern­
ment’s conservative tint will aggra­
vate tensions between minorities and 
the majority. “Our two years of grace 
are over,” says Gypsy spokesperson 
Samkova, who slipped into parlia­
ment as a GCI deputy in 1990 under 
the Civic Forum umbrella.
Samkova’s efforts to put her or­
ganisation under the Klaus party’s 
wing during the 1992 election cam­
paign were rebutted. "They said that 
they were sorry but that they simply 
didn’t want to risk the white vote,” 
she explains. “The CDP doesn’t see 
how human rights and minority issues 
are useful to it. If something doesn’t 
bring them immediate economic 
profit, it’s expendable.” ■
PAUL HOCKENOS’ book Free to 
Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post- 
Communist Central Europe will ap­
pear in 1993.
THE JOYS OF SPRING
The End of History, 
It seems, may not be 
upon us after all—  
and with David Owen 
as its handmaiden, 
who can really be 
surprised? But it 
always rested on a 
dubious premise, at 
least as far as one 
allegedly liberal 
democratic western 
European country is 
concerned: namely, 
that history was 
moving in the first 
place.
In Ireland, history has a habit of getting stuck—and usually in the most uncomfortable places, like 
the 17th century. One German mem­
ber of the European Parliament recog­
nised that fact during last year’s crisis 
over the right of a 14 year-old alleged 
rape victim to travel to Britain for an 
abortion. “I propose,” he said, “that 
only states which have experienced 
the Age of Enlightenment can be 
members [of the EC].”
But if such dangerously new­
fangled concepts such as the separa­
tion of church and state have still to 
be fully accepted in the Republic, the 
political party system has at least ad­
vanced unequivocally into the 20th 
century—all the way to 1923, to be 
exact. That was the year in which the 
brief but savage civil war ended. The 
war was fought over the treaty signed 
with Britain in 1921, which granted 
the 26 counties which now constitute 
the Republic of Ireland de facto inde­
pendence, but left the six north-east­
ern counties with large protestant 
populations under British rule. The 
pro-treaty forces defeated the hardline 
republicans who refused to accept 
partition. Yet the cleavage between 
the two was to remain the essential 
dividing line in Irish politics for the 
next 70 years, as the opposing civil 
war factions evolved into constitu­
tional political parties, Fianna Fail 
(anti-treaty) and Fine Gael (pro- 
treaty).
It remained so until last Novem­
ber’s elections, when the Labour Party
achieved what seems to be a historic 
breakthrough, more than doubling its 
representation to 33 seats in the 165- 
seat parliament. This achievement, 
modest enough as it appears on paper, 
has been greeted as a watershed in 
Irish political history, the ‘end of civil 
war politics’. The two main parties 
between them secured only 63% of 
the primary vote, Fianna Fail register­
ing their worst performance since 
1927, Fine Gael theirworst since 1948.
After two months of horse trad ing, 
Labour rather surprisingly decided to 
enter a coalition with Fianna Fail, 
securing six cabinet positions, and 
the posts of deputy prime minister 
and foreign minister for their popular 
leader, Dick Spring. The long-term 
significance of the result lies less in 
the particular nature of the govern­
ment formed in its aftermath than in 
the vastly increased influence wielded 
by Labour, the prospect of further 
erosion of the two main parties’ votes 
in the future, and the development of 
a more conventional political system 
characterised by Left-Right distinc­
tions rather than atavistic mysticism.
Ironically, it is the party repre­
senting the losers in the civil war, 
Fianna Fail (‘Warriors of Destiny’), 
which has dominated Irish political 
history ever since they swallowed their 
pride and entered parliament in 1927. 
Fianna Fail have governed alone or 
(briefly) in coalition for no less than 
44 years since then. Since 1932, Fine 
Gael (‘The Tribe of the Gaels’) has 
always been the second largest party.
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The differences between the two 
have always been ones of style, culture 
and tradition, rather than substance. 
Fianna Fail have traditionally tended 
towards populism and opportunism, 
cementing their rural power base 
through protectionism, identification 
with ‘Catholic values’ and windy rheto­
ric on the Republic’s claim to sover­
eignty overNorthem Ireland. The party 
never fails to exude a strong whiff of 
corruption and cronyism, a factor 
which contributed strongly to succes­
sive failures to win an outright paiiia- 
mentary majority in the 1980s, the 
dramatic defeat of their candidate in 
the 1990 presidential election, and the 
downfall of leader, Charles Haughey, 
in January of last year.
Fine Gael, by contrast, aspire these 
days to be a modem conservative party, 
unhampered by Fianna Fail’s need to 
pay lip-service to their origins. But 
while Fine Gael’s lack of historical 
baggage has enabled them to make 
more imaginative initiatives on the 
Northern Ireland problem, it has also 
left them at the mercy of the prevailing 
ideological winds. In abandoning the 
relatively liberal social policies of 
former leader Garrett Fitzgerald in fa­
vour of free-market orthodoxy they 
have lost the allegiance of liberal, mid­
dle-class Dublin to Labour. In a coun­
try where the urban middle class is in 
many respects the most radical section 
of the electorate, it’s hard to see where 
a party committed to economic liber­
alism and with no alternative core 
constituency can go for support.
But the substantive policy differ­
ences between the two parties are im­
permanent and often almost imper­
ceptible. Fianna Fail’s populist tradi­
tion didn’t prevent it implementing 
severepublic spendingcuts inthename 
of fiscal rectitude in the late 1980s. 
Fine Gael have swung from Fitzgerald’s 
principled and genuine liberalism to 
pseudo-Thatcherism in the space of 
five years. The ideological malleabil­
ity of Irish politics can be clearly seen 
from the fact that following the elec­
tion almost any combination of parties 
seemed possible as a coalition govern­
ment. Faced with the unenviable 
choice between the morally bankrupt 
Fianna Fail and the economically in­
compatible Fine Gael, as coalition part­
ners, Labour opted for the former. 
They have come in for a good deal of 
criticism for doing so, having previ­
ously been the most vocal critics of 
Fianna Fail chicanery while in office. 
But at least it doesn’t immediately 
compromise their economic policies 
as another alliance with Fine Gael 
would have.
The glue that has held the two- 
party system together for so long has 
been the vague underlying percep­
tion of the parties as respectively ‘more 
republican’ or ‘less republican’. But 
the persistence of the war in North­
ern Ireland is almost the only arena 
left for displaying such stances—and 
even here the scope for action, as 
opposed to rhetoric for domestic con­
sumption, is small.
As the violence in the North 
shows no sign of ending, the irrel­
evance of the policy stances of the 
majorparties in the Republic become 
more and more apparent to the elec­
torate. Northern Ireland is simply not 
an issue in the Republic’s elections. 
Paradoxically, this shift away from a 
politics based at least in theory on 
varying shades of nationalism could 
be a step forward for North-South 
relations. If Labour continues to gain 
in strength, it can surely only be a 
matter of time before they attempt to 
remove (by referendum) the Repub­
lic’s constitutional claim to the terri­
tory of Northern Ireland.
That would at least goa small part 
of the way towards lifting the siege 
mental ity of the Northern Protestants, 
whose refusal to countenance any 
political arrangements perceived as 
diluting the union with Britain helps 
to make ‘normal’ politics in the North 
impossible. The more the Republic 
moves towards a modem, secular state, 
the less easy it will be for the Protes­
tants to raise the bogey of a Catholic- 
dominated 32-county state as a fun­
damental threat to their way of life, 
and a barrier to any change.
Of more immediate concern to 
the southern electorate are the 
economy and the great social ques­
tions of abortion and divorce. It’s in 
the latter area that Labour’s increased 
influence is likely to have the most 
immediate effect. Indeed, the new 
government’s very first move was to
announce the decriminalisation ofho- 
mosexuality and a new referendum on 
the constitutional ban on divorce. But 
the economic and social spheres are 
closely linked. Ireland’s hugely im­
portant agricultural sector has ben­
efited to a massive extent from EC 
subsidies, as have its underdeveloped 
western areas. The idea of Europe is 
popular among many young urban 
people (as it is in Scotland), since it 
offers a new and more positive frame 
of reference than the old antagonism- 
cum-inferiority-complex towards Eng­
land. The Irish delight in being good 
Europeans while the English so con­
spicuously are not.
But this enthusiasm for Europe 
inevitably implies a trade-off. If Ire­
land wants to continue enjoying the 
economic benefits of association with 
its larger and richer neighbours, it also 
has to become something more akin 
to a modem European nation itself. 
That means that archaic social legis­
lation will eventually have to go. 
There was a hint that such changes 
might come sooner rather than later 
in the 1990 election of the candidate 
of the Left, Mary Robinson, as Presi­
dent. Robinson, who made her name 
championing causes such as the right 
to information about abortion, and 
who has taken a conscious and coura­
geous stance against misty-eyed re­
publicanism, embodies the new mood 
in Irish politics.
Her election was a sensation at 
the time, but the results of last No­
vember’s poll suggest that it was a 
harbinger of more hopeful things to 
come rather than an aberration. Ire­
land’s electorate continues to surprise 
itself: 20 women were elected to par­
liament (constituting 12% of the to­
tal), the highest ever number. Above 
all, the rejection of two parties with 
no credible contemporary raison d'etre 
marks the next phase in the moderni­
sation process. Ironically, as Left and 
Right become more nebulous con­
cepts in most other democratic coun­
tries, in Ireland they are finally start­
ing to make sense. History there has 
sputtered into life again, and not be­
fore time. ■
MIKE TICHER is ALR’s assistant 
editor.
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BRIEFINGS
DR HEWSON
GOMES TO TOWN
1992 saw 
Labor under 
Paul 
Keating 
undergo a 
remarkable 
electoral 
revival. 
Rodney 
Cavalier 
argues that 
despite 
Fightback 
Mark II 
Labor 
continues to 
assume the 
policy high 
ground as 
the election 
looms.
This time last year Paul Keating was new to the office to which he had so long as­pired. No-one has entered the prime min­istership so well prepared for its intellec 
tual challenges since the halcyon days of Gough 
Whitlam. From December 1991 Keating under­
stood very clearly what he needed to do to recreate 
a winning combination of issues and voter blocs.
Every objective measurement dictated that the 
federal Labor government as it entered its tenth 
year was heading for a massive defeat. But pol itics is 
not about such neat objectivity. Keating under­
stood that the Opposition has to position itself in 
favourable comparison to a faltering government. 
Keating believes he has witnessed the ALP (and 
especially federal Labor) blow near certain victory 
on more than one occasion. Losing elections un­
necessarily is part of the mythology of the ALP, a 
mythology that was one of the most powerful influ­
ences on a young party member of the 1960s.
There is no matrix or formula by which a gov­
ernment loses office. Once it was believed that 
something less than full employment was electorally 
fatal. The 70s and 80s put paid to that fond notion. 
Nor, it appears, is there a ‘shelf-life’ to a government 
after which re-election becomes progressively more 
difficult. With a renewal of personnel and policies, 
plus a sympathetic electoral system, a government 
can continue indefinitely. John Major in Britain 
demonstrated that the mood for change is not 
irreversible. At the end of the 80s, a decade in 
which Labor had gained its most sustained period of 
electoral success at both state and federal levels, the 
principal rules for winning are twofold: first, main­
taining control of the political agenda; and, second, 
avoidingfinancialorpersonal mishaps which might 
lend themselves to the appearance that ministers 
are tainted personally and/or that the government 
has lost the plot. Isolated governmental atrocities 
and episodic unpopularity matter only when their 
cumulative impact undermines credibility.
Although no previous federal opposition leader 
has been quite so inept as John Hewson, Keating 
has not been deluded that Hewson, with all his best 
efforts, alone could save the government (though 
there were times in 1992 when even Keating must 
have wondered whose side Hewson was on). The 
truth is that the repulsiveness of an opposition 
alternative has provided no relief when the incum­
bents have forfeited their credibility as govern­
ments; the repulsiveness of Greiner in NSW and 
Kennett in Victoriadidnot, in the end, matterabit. 
The Keating strategy for re-election has turned on 
an immediate and overwhelming demonstration of 
his mastery of the office of prime minister so that no 
one would seriously question that he was in charge 
of his Cabinet and that the Cabinet, in turn, was in 
control of the nation’s affairs.
Keating has combined control of the agenda 
with a brief to reinstill confidence in the broad 
policy directions of the government. The tight 
budgetary policies of the 1980s have excluded the 
old-style electoral remedy of a grab-bag of goodies 
funded from the public purse. Keating has done as 
much as anyone to discredit that handy standby in 
difficult times, while Hewson’s central philosophy 
has disbarred him from that recourse. Instead, gov­
ernment spending will go into infrastructure— big 
projects preferably, employing large numbers of 
people and injecting money for further spending. 
Essentially confident that the economic package of 
One Nation was going to come right, Keating has 
directed his mind and the attention of the media to 
non-economic questions, revealing that he wants 
to initiate debates on the fabric of the nation.
Even in a recession there are many non-eco­
nomic preoccupations for the electorate and the 
interest groups which influence voting behaviour. 
(And, for all of the piety to the contrary, no govern­
ment has ever been able to diminish the pre-emi­
nence of interest groups in electoral politics.) An­
other means of translating the electoral impact of
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unemployment of 11% is to deduct that number 
from 100. The resulting 89% or so who remain 
employed doubtless have real fears about their own 
security— and equally doubtless, the real numbers 
of unemployed are far greater than the official 
numbers. Nonetheless, people with economic secu­
rity do have other concerns about public policies— 
education, health, environment, transport, Abo­
riginal Australia and law and order, for example— 
and they worry about the impact of those policies on 
their families and their own perceptions of the sort 
of society they want Australia to be. Their eco­
nomic concerns, beyond jobs, are likely to include 
the climate for investment, interest rates, inflation 
and the certainty of policy direction.
Add to those employed the millions of full-time 
students over 18, the growing numbers of retired 
persons and those (mainly women) who prefer to 
work in their homes, and you have a very different 
portrait of political concern. A clever leader is
aware that there are residues of idealism, a desire for 
stability and a preoccupation with family matters 
(curiously embracing those who are not part of a 
family). Addressing all those concerns has been one 
of Paul Keating’s major achievements. The profes­
sional commentators entirely missed the point of 
his early comments about the meaning of the Kokoda 
Trail to modem Australia. In the best Labor tradi­
tion, Keating was not willing to accept the con­
servative definition of Australia’s heritage. Kissing 
the soil at Kokoda was the beginning of a year of 
serious, non-histrionic questioning of the imperial 
heritage.
By the end of 1992, other serious debates were 
running concurrently on the future of the monar­
chy, the oath of allegiance and the flag. Keating was 
advocating a reorientation of trade and economic 
focus on Asia. The most remarkable aspect of the 
strategy was that the conservatives have been sin­
gularly unable to persuade electors that these mat­
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ters were merely diversions, or to reopen the charge 
that Australian Labor was intrinsically disloyal. 
Later statements on children’s television and vio­
lence against women have served the dual purpose 
of fortifying Keating’s image as a solid family man 
while addressing the need to reawaken enthusiasm 
among traditional Labor voters. His statement on 
reconcil iat ion with Aboriginal peoples offended no 
one of consequence and aroused widespread admi­
ration.
The travails of John Hewson provided minimal 
distraction; Keating paused to shoot down his oppo­
site number only when the target was irresistible. 
The Fightback! package, all on its own, provoked 
questions and doubts with which the government 
had only to connect in order to score points. Simple 
arithmetic has brought home the impact of a Goods 
and Services Tax at 15%, and the pay-off via tax 
cuts was never convincing. The ALP leadership 
was in the luxurious position of entering sordid 
matters of politics solely when it suited them and 
then firing from the high moral ground. The tariff 
question—an issue in which the federal govern­
ment had done so much to destroy faith among its 
traditional supporters—became an unlikely plus for 
the government when its own extensive reductions 
(courageous by any historical measure) were able to 
be portrayed as modest and humane because the 
opposition was promising to go so much further. 
Most of 1992 was that sort of year for federal Labor.
Australian party politics in 1992 seemed to be 
about turning preconceptions on their heads. The 
Liberal-National Party Coalition, from the still 
unaccustomed vantage point of opposition, have 
pursued a policy based on high-minded principle 
that delivers its benefits (if any) mainly to its core 
constituency. Contrary to every tenet of Menzies 
Liberalism, where winning was everything, the 
federal Coalition has expressly declared itself un­
concerned about the electoral consequences of 
their policies. It was as if, by some cosmic sleight of 
hand, the electoral politics of the 1950s have been 
replayed with the party groupings having swapped 
roles. Menzies had timed his premature elections in 
the 50s brilliantly; so did Hawke in the 80s. The 
Coalition has had doctrinal divisions and disputes 
over leadership which Labor has avoided largely 
because of the intellectual collapse of socialism and 
the internal collapse of the ALP Left. The preferen­
tial voting system which denied Labor office three 
times in the 23 years of conservative rule after 1949 
has now worked so much in its favour because the 
minor parties and single-issue groups have directed 
their ultimate preferences away from the conserva­
tives (Labor in the 80s won elections with a primary 
vote more than ten percentage points fewer than it 
used to lose with in the 1950s). When Keating 
finally moved against Hawke it was as surgical as 
these things can be and did not straddle a general 
election.
A huge gulf has opened between the two parties 
in the technical expertise that their elected and 
machine leaders bring to theirfiinctions. No one in 
the modem Liberal Party has the chutzpah of a Sir 
John Carrick. The scheming rogues whose every 
bent is towand winning reside in the state and 
federal ALP machines, a goodly number of whom 
have graduated to federal parliament, fflpecially^je 
Senate. Every decision of federal Cat#\et ‘b e n fs ’ 
from the hard-nosed realpolitik of the considera­
tion of the electoral impact of even minor decisions.
In late 1992, when the opinion polls were 
capturing what the hardheads in both parties had 
been hearing for some time, there was a big push in 
Labor ranks for an early dissolution of parliament. 
Keating resisted. Apart from his own distinct doubts 
about the wisdom of such a course, he was fortified 
by the same hardheads. They applied some of the 
first principles of the electoral geography of Aus­
tralia: Australia is an agglomeration of states and 
territories with an increasing tendency to vote 
according to regional predilection. It was remark­
able, really, that anyone could contemplate an 
early poll given the ALP’s standing in Victoria, 
South Australia and Western Australia. Just as the 
implementation of Jeff Kennett’s policies in Victo­
ria has lifted the ALP primary vote— very likely 
with a national spillover—so a state election in 
Western Australia can only assist federal Labor.
In an eerie reversal of the Whitlam experience, 
federal Labor has been undermined by the states— 
not hostile conservative state governments this 
time around, but rather the accrued disasters of 
financial management by state Labor governments. 
Time and a clear separation from localised disasters 
could only assist federal Labor. The one constant in 
these calculations was that Hewson was not going 
to alter Fightback!. Not significantly. Not at all.
The private pressure on Hewson to remove the 
GST on food before Christmas was immense. Both 
the integrity of the package and its arithmetic 
depended on there being no exemptions. The very 
basis of Hewson’s bloodless accession to the leader­
ship turned on his commitment to an express mani­
festo for the alternative government which would 
be the lodestar after victory. Never again, it was 
vowed, would Australia’s conservatives have to 
witness the Lost Opportunity with which they 
associate the Fraser years. Hewson’s election was 
the final triumph for the ideologues against the fix- 
it mentality of Menzies Liberalism. Hewson was 
1950s Labor reborn.
Those raised inside the Labor Party have ap­
proached each general election in the sure and 
certain knowledge that the conservatives will say 
anything and do anything in order to be elected. 
Was a Hewson-led Coalition going to be different? 
Was it possible that Labor was going to receive its 
first forfeit since Federation because the conserva­
tives had discovered a principle so important that it
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was worth losing an election for? As recently as the 
1960s, over Vietnam and defence generally, Labor 
had paid the same price. But would the conserva­
tives really go all the way ? The answer came before 
the end of 1992.
Hewson, we are told, discovered his Damascus 
inafruitshop in Sydney’s eastern suburbs— touched 
by the sad tale of a migrant family who were about 
to lose their family home in addition to the business 
which they had founded. Somehow, we are told, he 
decided the policies of the federal government were 
directly responsible for this calamity. It was not 
clear where virtue resided in this story: was it in the 
private enterprise of the resourceful migrant who 
had given it a go? What, otherwise, distinguished 
this victim of the economic downturn from all those 
other migrants and native-born who had lost their 
jobs through structural adjustment to the economy 
or contraction of the public sector? All those others 
had savings plans based on continuous employment 
and they too faced the loss of their family homes. 
Hewson’s promises to reduce public spending might 
raise cheers in Liberal Party conferences, but the 
effect in the community is immediate and visible 
when previous levels of company and household 
incomes cannot sustain expenditure on either capi­
tal or consumption (for example, fruit from the 
local fruitshop).
Keating PM has placed his faith in interven­
tionist and stimulatory policies. Apart from the 
individual relief those policies might have been 
providing, the government’s adherence to a phi­
losophy that governments were supposed to be 
helping people and communities in need was ex­
actly the message that voters have wanted to hear. 
In an address to the National Press Club, Hewson 
overthrew the fundamentals of the academic ortho­
doxy which had brought him into politics and so far 
up the greasy pole. Now, he decided, compassion 
was king. His government was going to be one of 
reconstruction through intervention and pump- 
priming. The John Hewson who came forth that 
day was straight out of a Frank Capra classic from 
the 1930s, from a movie like Mr Deeds Comes to 
Town— that beguiling story about a man beset with 
sudden riches who resolves his difficulties by giving 
away all of the bounty.
Early voter reaction to Dr Hewson’s betrayal 
of his own philosophy tends to support the view 
that the less odious substance of the new Fightback! 
package is more important to voters than is the loss 
of credibility that Hewson has suffered personally. 
The general election is once again wide open, it 
appears. The polls reveal to anyone who still has not 
grasped the point that voters do not pause to exam­
ine each set of economic statistics and mark the 
government accordingly. Trade figures or housing 
loan approvals, as columns in a newspaper, do not 
determine voting intentions. Hewson has lost to 
Keating on the score of personal credibility—even
though Keating has shed several personas on his 
way to the top—and he has not been able to dent 
Keating’s control of the national agenda. Now he 
has gambled all on the voters being willing to try 
any alternative which has a whiff of caring. Keating 
knows that Labor must ratchet its primary vote in 
the states where it is floundering to give its local 
campaigners any chance of surviving.
Throughout 1992, one read a lot of commen­
tary to the effect that “Hewson was home and hosed 
but for his GST’. This trite observation overlooked 
that the GST was John Hewson and the post-Fraser 
Liberal Party. No less true is that the Keating 
government, bar the recession, would have been 
heading fora landslide. That an opposition so inept 
has remained in the race underscores the otherwise 
terminal economic difficulties for the government. 
That is politics and politics is not about might- 
have-beens. The government has still to overcome 
the perils of an economy at the mercy of interna­
tional affairs. The opposition has to overcome itself. 
The coming months will sort out who possesses the 
credibility to convince a strategic spread of the 
electorate their party contains the answers. Both 
sides are now competing for the lofty ground of 
compassion and fairness. The early reaction to 
shedding the integrity of the GST was encouraging 
for the Coalition. The government has decided to 
come out of the trenches and leave it to Hewson's 
own ineptitude to sink the Coalition’s prospects of 
recovery. In that atmosphere, the government should 
be able to prepare for its fifth term by shedding the 
lunatic aspects of free market economics. The op­
position will not readily oppose such a course. Or 
will it? ■
RODNEY CAVALIER writes for the Financial 
Review. He was a senior minister in the 1976-88 
NSW Labor government.
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INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION
Jeff Kennett's 
industrial 
revolution 
has severely 
embarrassed 
his federal 
colleagues. 
But as PETER 
GAHAN 
reports, John 
Howard may 
have to 
resort to 
Kennett-style 
compulsion in 
order to get 
his new 
industrial 
dystopia 
under wayL
Since the accession of the Kennett govern­ment last November Victorians have en­dured an industrial relations revolution of a kind which probably few had expected. 
Even the federal Coalition, whose own industrial 
relations policy is hardly cupidic, have been se­
verely embarrassed by the Victorian Coalition’s 
‘reforms’, both by the speed and lack of consulta­
tion with which they have been implemented, 
and by their primitive and compulsory nature.
The federal government has not been slow to 
seize on this embarrassment, painting Victoria as 
a dry run of the Coalition’s policies federally. 
This has put the federal Coalition in an even 
more difficult position. If they repudiate the 
Victorian revolution they will be seen as repudi­
ating elements of their own industrial relations 
platform. But if they support it they will be seen 
as supporting Jeff Kennett’s punitive and unilat­
eral approach.
Just how similar are the industrial relations 
policies of the Victorian and federal Coalitions? 
And how significant are the differences? In short, 
the answer seems to be that the differences as well 
as similarities highlight some of the contradic­
tions of the federal Coalition’s industrial rela­
tions model.
There are two notable differences between 
the Victorian and federal Coalit ion’s pol icies and 
their likely effects. First, the fact that industrial 
relations is a shared power between the state and 
commonwealth governments implies that the 
safety net provided by the two policies will have 
a different impact in each case. And second, the
federal coalition’s professed intention to achieve 
a new workplace culture based on teamwork and 
co-operation will clearly require a different method 
of implementation to that used by the Kennett 
government.
First, the matter of jurisdiction. The federal 
government has limited powers to legislate in 
industrial relations. The major source of its indus­
trial relations powers lies in its ability to make 
laws to prevent and settle interstate industrial 
disputes. These powers are limited to creating 
arbitration and conciliation agents to deal with 
such matters on their behalf, rather than legislat­
ing directly.
Historically, this has meant that unions and 
arbitration courts have a limited ability to carve 
out a common rule, so that awards cover all 
workers in a given industry or occupation. Thus 
the ability of the arbitration system to act as an 
effective safety net has been limited.
More recently, however, the High Court has 
interpreted this aspect of the constitution more 
widely. Asa result, the jurisdiction of the Indus­
trial Relations Commission (IRC) has increased 
significantly over the last 20 years or so. And the 
federal government may derive powerTrom other 
sections of the constitution to directly regulate 
industrial matters, although the exercise of these 
powers remains controversial. These include the 
external affairs power (which allows the federal 
government, as a signatory, to enforce interna­
tional treaties and agreements) and the corpora­
tions power (which allows the regulation of cor­
porations formed within Australia).
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The federal Coalition intends to make full 
use of these other powers to allow it to take a more 
direct role in the regulation of industrial rela­
tions. If Jobsback! is implemented, compulsory 
arbitration will be abolished. Instead, employees 
and employers will have to negotiate an employ­
ment agreement either collectively or individu­
ally. These agreements will have the legal status 
of a contract and, as such, will be subject to 
common and criminal law proceedings. If strikes 
occur during the life of, or in breach of, an 
agreement, employers will be able to sue indi­
vidual employees for breach of contract and seek 
to recoup any economic losses.
The legal protection given to trade unions 
will be abolished. While the formation of enter­
prise unions is encouraged, the legal status of 
unions is not clear. Jobsback! intends to remove 
legal protections for trade unions, yet it is in­
tended that unions will be registered. The most 
likely result of this ambiguity is that any registra­
tion procedure will stand as little more than a 
legal fiction. This is reinforced by the intention 
to provide a reconstituted IRC with the ability to 
take control of union funds and their internal 
organisation. Here is the rub: unions will effec­
tively be denied any legal status or protections at 
the federal level. They will be left with fewer and 
less adequate minima (such as the $3 minimum 
youth wage) which do not apply to all workers 
(they do not apply to contractors or non-award 
workers, for instance), and which have decreas­
ing coverage over time.
Attempts to revert to state jurisdiction— 
where unions are also denied legal recognition 
but at least have the ‘protection’ of minima with 
common rule status—will also be blocked. The 
broader coverage of state minima stems from the 
constitution. While the federal government is by 
and large limited to indirect means, the state 
governments have the power to directly legislate 
to cover all workers. Additionally, where they do 
exist in state jurisdictions, awards also have com­
mon rule status.
The difference may seem slight in the scheme 
of things, especially given that minimum condi­
tions vary between the Victorian system and the 
Jobsback! proposal. Nevertheless, for many em­
ployees such limited protection may be quite 
fundamental to how they live their lives in a 
world where global restructuring has already con­
siderably diminished their labour market oppor­
tunities.
This having been said, however, it is clear 
that the similarities between the two packages far 
outweigh any differences between them, despite 
the federal Coalition’s attempts to distance 
Jobsback! from Victorian developments. The fed­
eral Coalition spokesperson on industrial rela­
tions, John Howard, has repeatedly stated that
federal changes would be introduced in a far less 
confrontationist way—especially since Jobsback! 
is intended to engender a shared ideology and a 
‘team approach’ to industrial relations.
However, despite the rhetorical differences 
between the two policies, John Howard may find 
that political reality will dictate a similar policy 
outcome to that of the Kennett government— 
including, ironically, a far more interventionist 
role for government in industrial relations. And 
this interventionist role will have, of necessity, 
to be based on compulsion and punitive sanc­
tions rather than the overriding philosophy of 
minimal government intervention expressed in 
Jobsback! or Howard’s political rhetoric.
While the focus of Fightback! was on the 
GST, embedded within it is a plan for a radical 
change in the conduct of industrial relations and 
the structure of labour markets. The hub of that 
plan is that wages outcomes and the conduct of 
industrial relations will occur solely at the 
workplace and at the discretion of that workplace. 
This, it is stated, will demand an end to the 
highly interventionist role of the government 
and arbitration machinery, through such things 
as National Wage Cases.
This was later detailed with the launch of 
Jobsback! The philosophical underpinning of this 
policy—and one which John Howard has been at 
pains to impress— is freedom of contract. In 
other words, the federal Coalition’s policy is 
supposed to provide employee and employer 
with a greater capacity to make decisions about 
how their employment relationship should be 
structured. In this view, the role of unions, state 
institutions and direct intervention of the state 
through legislation simply serve to ‘distort’ a 
relationship that is otherwise natural and can 
result in greater efficiencies and shared benefits. 
Thus the parties are ‘free’ to contract between 
themselves on such matters as hours of work 
(when and for how long), redundancy arrange­
ments, penalty rates, holiday loading and other 
such matters.
The intention of Jobsback! is thus the with­
drawal of the state from the sphere of industrial 
relations and the provision of a minimal institu­
tional framework. The regulation of the employ­
ment contract is to be indistinguishable from 
other commercial contracts. Remedies against 
breaches will be sought through civil court ac­
tion. Collectivities such as unions have no spe­
cial status before the law. The outcome, accord­
ing to this view, is that workplace ‘bargaining’ 
becomes the sovereign sphere of decision mak­
ing over work issues—and all for the greater 
good.
As with the federal Coalition, the focus of 
the Victorian reforms has been a concern with 
the impact of arbitration and unions on the
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conduct of workplace industrial relations. Both 
are seen to inhibit the proper conduct of indus­
trial relations, inhibiting workplace flexibility 
and productivity in particular. Thus, the primary 
goal is said to be to provide employees and em­
ployers with the ability to freely regulate employ­
ment conditions to suit the needs of the enter­
prise within the market.
However, in initiating these changes the Vic- 
torian government has taken a decidedly inter­
ventionist role. The effect of the Employment 
Relations Act 1992 has been to thwart the capac­
ity of workers to continue to undertake collective 
actions to protect their wages and working con­
ditions, subjecting them to criminal and com­
mon law sanctions. Under the Act, employees 
will have their terms and conditions set by one or 
more of four legal means. At the base level, the 
contract of employment will be the chief instru­
ment of common law. Second, individual em­
ployees can negotiate an individual employment 
agreement directly with their employer. Third, as 
an alternative to individual agreements, employ­
ees—with the consent of the employer—can 
decide to negotiate a collective employment agree­
ment. Finally, if there is consent from both em­
ployees and employer, the collective agreement 
may be ratified by a new Employee Relations 
Commission (ERC) as an industrial award.
Yet, despite this range of alternatives, the Act 
makes it difficult for a group of workers to elect for 
a collective employment agreement or an indus­
trial award as the source of their terms of employ­
ment—for two reasons. The most obvious one is 
that the Act removes the legal impunities for 
trade unions— impunities which remained largely 
intact even under the Thatcher government in 
the UK. Likewise, the ability of unions to gain 
legal status and protection of bargaining rights 
have remained features of US labour law also, 
despite ‘union bashing’ tactics on the part of 
employers.
The second reason lies in the changed struc­
ture of the legal regulation of industrial relations 
itself—particularly in the case of the diminished 
role of the new Victorian ERC. This body has 
fewer powers to deal with industrial disputes 
unless both parties consent. This, as historical 
experience with voluntary arbitration shows, is 
so unlikely as to render it ineffective. The major 
exception to this ‘imposed voluntarism’ is the 
case of unfair dismissals. However, the proce­
dures which individual employees are required to 
undertake to respond to unfair dismissal will 
make this a costly and lengthy process.
Instead of awards and the use of due process 
through tribunal regulation, employees will be 
forced over time to ‘negotiate’ individual or col­
lective employment agreements. Even here, the 
bias towards individual agreements will make
collective ones difficult in many cases. While the 
compulsion to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
ERC is removed, it is substituted for the compul­
sory jurisdiction of the new Industrial Division of 
the Magistrates Court. The court is armed with 
considerable punitive remedies to compel unions 
and employees to agree to the new industrial 
regulations.
Jobsback! is couched in the political rhetoric 
of freedom. The impending changes are supposed 
to free the workplace from the shackles of over­
regulation so that those at the workplace will be 
better able to decide such matters on equal terms 
themselves. The role of the state, so Jobsback! 
tells us, is to back off. It is to end the compulsory 
submission of both workers and employers to 
over-zealous governments and the specially-cre­
ated jurisdictions that provide certain interest 
groups with a status not enjoyed by other indi­
viduals and groups in society.
The reality of the intended policy is, how­
ever, diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and 
ideology of a free and happy workplace culture. 
Like the Victorian changes, Jobsback! is not so 
much about the withdrawal of the state from the 
regulation of employment matters and an end to 
compulsion but, rather, the substitution of one 
compulsory jurisdiction for another.
Common law regulation requires that the 
parties submit their disputes over breach of con­
tract at the request of one party only—as is 
currently the case with arbitration. In other words, 
it is not possible for the jurisdiction of common 
(and criminal) law courts to be denied simply 
because one party does not wish to submit to it.
The replacement of the jurisdiction of the 
IRC with that of common law courts cannot be 
reasonably interpreted as empowering the parties 
to make their own decisions freely in an 
unconstrained manner, for the good of all con­
cerned. Rather, it amounts to the replacement of 
one compulsory jurisdiction, historically created 
to ameliorate the imbalance of power between 
capital and labour, with another compulsory ju­
risdiction that has historically been hostile to the 
interests of working people and the institutions 
created to protect them in their working lives. 
The result will not increase freedom but, rather, 
greater compulsion, as the balance of bargaining 
power dramatically shifts towards employers with 
considerable resources and institutional support 
in their favour. Thus, whatever the intention, in 
practice the federal Coalition’s ‘deregulatory’ in­
dustrial relations policies may have to be imple­
mented with the same degree of coercive govern­
ment intervention as the V ictorian reforms which 
so embarrass John Howard. ■
P E T E R  G A H A N  teaches in Industrial Rela­
tions at Melbourne University.
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MORALITY, 
LEGALITY, 
DEPRAVITY
D
ebate over the legal regulation of ob­
scenity and pornography tends to be 
highly principled, in two senses. It is 
principled in that it appeals to a small 
number of general concepts which are supposed 
to form the rational grounds on which legal 
regulation is or is not legitimate. And it is princi­
pled in the sense that those who claim to have 
access to such general concepts comport them­
selves as principled persons, speaking in the name
o morality or pleasure on behalf of humanity, 
ere is no shortage of such principled argument,
on both sides of the debate over whether pub­
lished erotica should be open to legal regulation. 
Many liberals have argued that legal restrictions 
on non-violent erotica are an infringement of 
indivi uals’ rights to freely pursue theirown sexual 
development or, in the American context, of the 
principle of freedom of expression. Some femi­
nists, however, have countered by invoking an­
other right: the right of women to be represented 
in a manner that does justice to their full human­
ity, rather than in the caricatural forms spun-off 
to satisfy the male imagination.
Liberals tend to 
take the high 
moral ground 
against the 
censorship of 
pornography. 
Ian Hunter 
suggests this 
moral high 
ground may be 
a bit shaky. 
Governing 
pornography is 
a more 
complex 
business than 
the partisans in 
the censorship 
debate allow.
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The ensuing debate has been notable more 
for the indignation it has fuelled than for the 
insight it has provided, as is typically the case 
when contestants imagine themselves to be the 
principled champions of competing moral abso­
lutes. In the course of researching and writing On 
Pornography with David Saunders and Dugald 
Williamson, it became increasingly clear to us 
that these attempts to provide a principled analy­
sis of obscenity law were both historically inaccu­
rate and ethically inappropriate. Drawing on that 
book, I want to argue here that such principled 
argument has long since outlived both its fruitful­
ness as a way of understanding how obscenity law 
actually works and its usefulness as a means of 
educating public opinion. I will argue that the 
legal regulation of obscenity neither is nor can be 
based on general concepts. As a result, we must 
learn to comport ourselves in a far less principled 
manner, if we wish to participate in a discussion 
that has any bearing on the way in which the 
policing of pornography affects our modes of 
conduct.
Most of the publ ic debate over pornography is 
organised by three interlocking principles: those 
of harm, representation and private freedom. 
These principles play an important role in the 
feminist case for greater legal regulation of por­
nography, but as they are more familiar to us in 
liberal and libertarian arguments for deregulation 
I will concentrate on this latter use of them.
Liberal moral and political philosophy holds 
that obscenity law— like otherforms of law—can 
be reformed through an analysis of the rational 
and moral principles on which it is or should be 
based, followed by its reconstruction in accord­
ance with the clarified principles. The classic 
modem example of this approach is the Report of 
the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship 
(1979) chaired by the British moral philosopher 
Bernard Williams, a report which is resolutely 
representative of liberal philosophical argument 
on obscenity law.
It begins by enunciating the ‘harm principle’ 
of legal regulation in its classical form. Accord­
ing to this principle, if freedom is to be pre­
served— as the necessary condition of individual 
self-development—then individuals must have 
the right to conduct themselves as they choose, 
except for those forms of conduct that infringe 
the rights of other individuals and thereby harm 
them. Then this principle is applied to published 
erotica, and it is here that a second principle— 
that of representation— is called on. Erotic ait 
and pornography consist of representations or 
ideas which, while they may be morally offensive 
to some individuals, cannot harm them. Given 
this, individuals must be free to produce, dissemi­
nate and consume such representations, just in 
case they contain the true (but socially unpopu­
lar) form of our sexual self-development.
One exception to this rule is allowed, for a 
special class of pornographic representations. This 
is reserved for pictorial depictions of sex whose 
explicitness is such that they offend or excite in 
a coercive manner, infringing the subject’s ca­
pacity and right to entertain or reject them at 
will, and thereby threatening to cross the border 
from ideas to actions. The Williams Report rec­
ommends not that such specially offensive repre­
sentations be banned—even they might contain 
a glimmer of our sexual truth—but that they be 
restricted, to mature volunteer audiences con­
suming them in private. The space of individual 
private freedom—whose boundaries are marked 
here by the bedroom door and the adults-only 
book or video shop— thus represents an absolute 
or principled limit, beyond which it is rationally 
and morally illegitimate for the state or the law to 
encroach.
There are many comments that one might 
make on this attempt to subordinate legal ration­
ality and regulation to the ‘higher’ principles of 
philosophical analysis. Given the constraints of 
space I will content myself with one. Each of the 
three principles mentioned above— of harm, rep­
resentation and private freedom—presupposes 
that human beings are subjects defined by indi­
vidual possession of the capacity for free rational 
and moral self-development. It is this capacity 
that justifies the harm principle. All ‘externally 
imposed’ doctrine and regulation is relegated in 
favour of the ‘right’ to the free individual exercise 
of reason and moral judgement—which includes 
the right to free expression—as long as this doesn’t 
infringe the rights possessed by other individuals.
Further, it is the presumed possession of this 
capacity that justifies liberals in viewing pornog­
raphy as a matter of (harmless) representations or 
ideas, given to a moral personality able to enter­
tain or reject them at will, through the exercise of 
rational judgement. Finally, the figure of the 
rational subject justifies a degree of legal regula­
tion (of representations whose pornographic of­
fensiveness makes them coercive) but also limits 
this regulation (to the public sphere, where it 
protects only the immature and the unadventur­
ous). In criticising each of the above three 
principles it is this figure of the free self-develop­
ing subject that I am aiming at.
The liberal attempt to achieve a deregulatory 
reform of obscenity law on the basis of the prin­
ciples of ‘harm to others’, representation and 
private freedom is confronted by a number of 
problems. The first relates to the attempt to use 
the harm principle as an instrument for setting 
general limits to legal regulation. Clearly this 
principle must be capable of specifying harm at a 
general level, independently of particular types 
of harm (such as the harm of obscene publica-
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tion). After all, the harm principle is supposed to 
provide general criteria for deciding whether 
such particular ‘harms’ are indeed harmful. As a 
number of writers have pointed out, however, 
this presupposed generality of the harm principle 
is not particularly plausible.
In the case of affirmative action and equal 
opportunity legislation, for example, it is implau­
sible to suggest that the harm associated with 
discriminatory employment practices could be 
specified independently of particular social poli­
cies: namely, those aimed at increasing the pro­
portion of women or other minority groups in the 
professions. But if this is the case then what is to 
count as harm will be determined by the norms, 
practices and objectives of particular policy do­
mains or institutional settings. Such local 
determinations of harm will not be subject to 
philosophical adjudication by the general harm 
principle, which must be seen simply as a mis­
leading puree of specific historical calculations of 
harm.
This explains why abortion law is so resistant 
to a ‘rights-based’ philosophical rectification. 
Here the law does not and cannot use the harm 
principle to set an absolute criterion for legal 
intervention or for legal deregulation, based (re­
spectively) on the fetus’ absolute right to life, or 
on the mother’s absolute right to control her 
reproductive capacities. Instead, it has delegated 
tthe determination of what is to count as harm (to 
the mother’s mental and physical well-being) to 
medical expertise—an expertise informed in this 
instance by quite mundane calculations regard­
ing the social and personal costs of an illicit 
abortion industry. Rights don’t come into it and, 
given the threat to social peace posed by compet­
ing moral zealotries, this is probably a good thing.
The same logic applies to the so-called ‘de­
prave and corrupt’ test, the legal specification of 
the harm of obscene publication that emerged in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. This 
was arrived at in the context of wider governmen­
tal policies and campaigns of moral reform. The 
object of these policies and campaigns was to 
regulate the circulation of pornography, con­
ceived of as an agent capable of perversely affect­
ing the moral conducts and capacities of vulner­
able sectors of the population. It was as a means 
of pursuing this social objective that the harms of 
obscene publication were determined, not be­
cause pornography was thought to be a threat to 
free self-developing subjectivity.
Our historians of sexuality have done us no 
service in ascribing the 19th century medical 
problematisation of pornography to sexually re­
pressed middle-class men, for whose sins William 
Acton has been forced to run the gauntlet of 
humanist indignation and historical wish-fulfil- 
ment. Listen instead to the voice of Elizabeth
Blackwell, advocate of Christian socialism and 
women’s rights, speaking to us from 1879 through 
her influential manual, Counsel to Parents: On the 
Moral Education of their Children in Relation to Sex:
The dangers arising from vicious literature 
of any kind, cannot be overestimated by 
parents. Whether sensuality be taught by 
police reports, or by Greek and Latin litera­
ture, by novels, plays, songs, penny papers, 
or any species of the corrupt literature now 
sent forth broadcast, and which finds its 
way into the hands of the young of all 
classes and both sexes, the danger is equally 
real... No amount of simple caution, given 
by parents or instructors, suffices to guard 
the young mind from the influence of evil 
literature . .. The permanent and incalcu­
lable injury which is done to the young 
mind by vicious reading, is proved by all 
that we know about the structure and meth­
ods of the human mind... These important 
facts have a wide and constant bearing on 
education, showing the really poisonous 
character of all licentious literature .. .and 
its destructive effect on the quality of the 
brain.
In fact, despite her reference to ‘the young of 
all classes and both sexes’, Blackwell was prima­
rily concerned with the effects of pornography on 
middle-class boys. The language of moral physi­
ology is really a disguised instrument of ethical 
pedagogy, designed to pathologise not sex in 
general, but masculine auto-erotic gratification— 
something that Blackwell believed was intensi­
fied by the ‘solitary vice’ of pornography and 
robbed women of sexual pleasure and conjugal 
intimacy. No doubt there are some to whom 
Elizabeth Blackwell’s campaign to improve het­
erosexual mutuality will seem an absurd anachro­
nism. Yet she was quite representative of the 
struggle to improve women’s lot in marriage; and 
the stigmatisation of pornography as an agency of 
male sexual selfishness remains an important part 
of the women’s movement, albeit not of its more 
florid and cultic fringes.
Of course, it eventually became possible to 
laugh at the language of moral physiology, a 
language that in the mid-nineteenth century 
described pornography as a social toxin, causing 
pathological effects in the social and personal 
body. But to ridicule this language in order to 
demonstrate the harmlessness of erotica, in the 
name of a less repressed and more knowledgeable 
modernity, is to miss the point. The objective of 
regulating access to pornography as an instru­
ment of moral malformation remains current, 
even if this harm is now spoken of in languages 
other than the one that first specified the harm of
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depravity and corruption.
Today, the harm of pornography is more 
likely to be specified in terms of an optimal 
pedagogical formation of the young, and in terms 
of the civic and occupational harms caused to 
women by their public eroticisation. The fact 
that liberal political and moral philosophy pre­
sumes to sit in judgement on these local calcula­
tions of harm— insisting that while pornography 
may be morally offensive it is not harmful— may 
be a sign of the limits of its principled analysis. To 
see why, we need to turn to liberalism’s second 
general concept, representation.
Liberalism is convinced that pornography is 
harmless because it assumes that pornography 
consists of representations or ideas, and that the 
subject of these ideas possesses the rational and 
moral capacity to entertain or reject them at will. 
While some individuals might be offended by 
pornographic representat ions they, by definition, 
cannot be harmed by them, and erotic ideas must 
enjoy free circulation in liberal societies. But, as 
we have noted, the principle of representation is 
not applied with absolute consistency. The 
Williams Report identifies certain erotic repre­
sentations which are so offensive and/or arous­
ing—due to their ‘photographic’ explicitness— 
that they threaten to ‘coerce’ the capacity for 
judgement and thereby forfeit the free circula­
tion accorded to ideas.
It soon becomes apparent, however, that this 
notion of a special class of coercive ideas is 
neither more nor less than a modem philosophi­
cal variation on the old notion of morally patho­
logical representations. In both cases what is in 
fact being alluded to is a particular use of pornog­
raphy and the moral incompetence of its users. 
This implicit tying of harms to uses and types of 
user opens the door to two sets of facts which are 
incompatible with liberal principles, but which 
lie at the heart of the legal regulation of obscen­
ity.
First, it allows us to see that pornography is 
not a representation of sex but a particular prac­
tice of sex using representations. The standard 
histories suggest that erotica and pornography are 
timeless attempts to represent the truth of sex, 
perhaps distorted by epochs of sexual fear and 
repression. Recent scholarship, however, sug­
gests that pornography in the modem sense first 
emerged in the seventeenth century, as a result of 
the unexpected overlapping of a particular spir­
itual discipline and anovel communications tech­
nology.
The spiritual discipline was the technique of 
sexual confession. In the French historian Michel 
Foucault’s path-breaking account, confession is 
not a repression of sexuality. Rather, it is an 
apparatus that uses repression as a technique for 
creating a particular sense and reality of sexual­
ity— one in which the practitioner relates to his 
orherdesire as enigmatic, hidden, silenced: hence 
as something that must be endlessly interpreted, 
revealed, liberated, spoken of. It was from this 
spiritual ‘practice of the self— in which access to 
pleasure was tied to the forms in which desire was 
interpreted and spoken of—that modem pornog­
raphy first emerged.
Pornography emerged— initially as a highly 
specialised practice for a stratum of male erotic 
virtuosi—as a profane improvisation on the con­
fessional interpretation of desire as the hidden 
truth of the self. Early modem pornography was 
a coded practice of reading and writing through 
which certain individuals could obtain pleasure 
from their bodies through the manner in which 
they probed them to uncover the erotic truth 
about themselves.
And it was the dissemination of this perverse 
discourse of the flesh, through the technology of 
the printed book, that was responsible for a shift 
in its regulation. The social scale and power of 
printed erotica required that its regulation move 
from the religious to the secular courts. This 
occurred in 1727, when Edmund Curll became 
the first individual to be convicted of the unprec­
edented common law crime of obscene publica­
tion. What convinced the judges that Curll’s 
offence was a crime rather than a sin, was the 
printed character of the work—Venus in the Clois­
ter, or the Nun in her Smock—which ‘allowed it to 
go all over the kingdom’.
Pornographic books are not therefore simply 
a convenient means of circulating erotic ideas. 
Sex and the book are far more intimately related 
than this, as pornography is in fact a biblioerotics 
or ‘book sex’. Pornography is thus not a represen­
tation of real sexual practice, but a r£al practice of 
sex using representations. The production and 
consumption of pornography does not therefore 
consist in a parade of ideas floating past the 
rational subject. It is rather aproblematic species 
of social conduct (part perverse spiritual disci­
pline, part profitable commercial activity) the 
question of whose harm can in no way be settled 
by simply appealing to the principle of represen­
tation.
The second set of facts inconvenient for lib­
eral principles concerns the particular and vari­
able nature of moral competence. Liberal moral 
philosophy posits an individual subject who (once 
a rather uncertain threshold of maturity has been 
crossed) is presumed rationally and morally capa­
ble of judging presented ideas. If one accepts, 
however, that pornography transmits not ideas 
but a set of instruments and practices for cultivat­
ing autoerotic sensibilities and conducts, then 
the notion of a general moral personality capable 
of rationally accepting or rejecting pornography 
becomes untenable.
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Seen in this light the individual is not the 
bearer of a unitary moral personality. Rather, the 
individual is the human platform for a variety of 
historical ways of conducting the self—formed 
and maintained through disparate ethical 
trainings and ethical institutions. Ethical com­
petence is thus not an all-or-nothing affair, but 
varies with category of person, social setting and 
cultural level. It is for this reason that obscenity 
law generally does not seek to ban publications 
outright on the grounds of intrinsic obscenity. 
Instead, it attempts to administer a variable ac­
cess to them, on the basis of categories of vulner­
able consumers and problematic consumptions. 
Thus, historically, a work sold cheaply on the 
streets near schools might be obscene; whereas 
the same work sold to an educated public in a 
scholarly edition might not be.
The standard liberal philosophical view of 
obscenity law as a repressive policing of unpopu­
lar but harmless ideas is thus historically inaccu­
rate and morally inept. Obscenity law is not an 
attempt to censor or repress pornography but to 
regulate its consumption. It forms part of a social 
programme (however successful) aimed at regu­
lating access to pornography as a morally danger­
ous commodity on the basis of a sliding scale of 
moral competence. The censorship classification 
table for films and videos is a particular instance 
of this scale. Here, degrees of moral competence 
are aligned with age— though this is not always 
so. In the case of pedophile pornography it is 
adult males who may be declared morally incom­
petent, given certain circumstances of consump­
tion and use.
Like liberalism, the legal regulation of por­
nography also determines thresholds beyond 
which the law should not pass. Unlike liberalism 
it does not attempt to establish an absolute de­
marcation between the sphere of law and that of 
morality, based on the principles of harm and 
representation. Instead it operates a far more 
sophisticated floating threshold of legal inter­
vention. This threshold treats the capacity for 
moral self-regulation not as a native endowment 
of the moral personality but as an ethical ability, 
unevenly distributed in populations depending 
on their systems of education, policing and wel­
fare.
For this reason there can be no principled 
distinction between a public sphere of legal regu­
lation and a private sphere of moral freedom. The 
right to conduct oneself as one chooses in private 
is not an absolute one, guaranteed by the freedom 
of conscience acting within the limits of the harm 
principle. Rather, it is a right contingent upon 
specific social and ethical circumstances—or, in 
fact, on the social distribution of the disposition 
to choose certain conducts rather than others.
Private freedom in this area of life is in effect
a civil status conferred on those possessing the 
capacity to conduct themselves within the so­
cially defined norms of moral competence. For 
this reason, there are some forms of conduct— 
such as rape in marriage or the consumption of 
pedophile pornography—which are never pri­
vate, whether they take place behind the bed­
room door or not. This is not because such 
conducts infringe the general principle of ‘harm 
to others’. Rather, it is because they are deemed 
harmful within the ethical and legal contexts 
formed by particular moral reform campaigns or 
governmental social programmes. The campaign 
to de-eroticise women in the workplace, for ex­
ample, may provide the moral context in which 
the display of pin-ups in locker-rooms is deemed 
harmful, in which locker-rooms lose their pri­
vacy, and in which their inhabitants are required 
to develop new moral competences and con­
ducts.
At such moments it ill becomes intellectuals 
to stand on principle. There is something 
unedifying in the repetitious theatrics of the 
liberal public conscience, where intellectuals 
purport to show the harmlessness of erotica and to 
defend the freedom of sexual expression, speak­
ing in the name of philosophical principles that 
are presumed to stand above the complex 
mundanity of the legal system. By parity of argu­
ment, the same goes for those analyses—equally 
contemptuous of legal rationality—which pur­
port to show the harmfulness of pornography by 
treating it as an infringement of women’s right to 
be represented in a ‘fully human’ manner.
If the preceding account is correct then the 
production and consumption of erotica is, intrin­
sically, neither harmless nor harmful. If the harm 
of pornography is indeed relative to the variable 
moral competences of its consumers, determined 
by the norms of particular moral campaigns and 
social programs, then it is our relation to these 
campaigns and programs that must determine our 
attitude to pornography. Under these condi­
tions, for intellectuals to invoke the usual princi­
ples, and defend the right to freedom of expres­
sion, amounts to a failure to confront the actual 
circumstances of their own ethical and legal 
obligations. And, for once, it is true to say that 
this posture is particularly suspect when it is 
adopted by men. They are, after all, defending a 
problematic cultivation of their bodies and 
minds. ■
IAN HUNTER is an Australian Research 
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A GREEN TO 
DISAGREE
Has the 
recession 
sunk 
Australians' 
newfound 
commitment 
to the envi­
ronment?
ELM 
PAPADAKIS 
thinks not.
But he 
argues that 
the green 
movement of 
the next 
decade will 
have a very 
different, 
more policy- 
minded face.
G
reen interest groups and social movements 
face a crisis of identity. Over the past two 
decades in Australia, as in many other coun­
tries, these groups and movements have 
succeeded beyond their wildest dreams in contrib­
uting to the rise in awareness of the dangers of 
environmental destruction. Nowadays, everyone, 
including business, industry and labour, is ‘green’.
For organisations like the Wilderness Society 
and Greenpeace this has meant a shift in tactics. 
Whereas in the past they emphasised the funda­
mental conflict between environmental protection 
and economic development, they are now either 
thinking about or actually collaborating with estab­
lished institutions in trying to develop viable poli­
cies for environmental protection and economic 
development. Last September, Paul Gilding, the 
new international director of Greenpeace, an­
nounced that the organisation would switch its 
tactics from confrontation to co-operation with 
government and industry. This is not to say that the 
Greens have abandoned confrontation. Rather, I 
would argue that they have become much more 
involved in the political process and that this re­
flects major changes in attitudes and some changes 
in patterns of behaviour among groups that have in 
the past been mainly concerned about economic 
growth and development.
An important force driving the Greens to col­
laborate with ‘the enemy’ (meaning business, in­
dustry, labour and the established political parties) 
is their acute awareness of the dangers involved in 
delaying the implementation of new policies, nota­
bly over issues like the protection of the ozone layer. 
Furthermore, by refusing to collaborate they are in
danger of being marginalised in debate about policy 
implementation.
All this is not to suggest that established institu­
tions have uniformly accepted or have a shared 
understanding of environmentalism. Different (and 
often conflicting) strategies have been developed 
to tackle the problem of environmental degrada­
tion. Different (and often conflicting) interpreta­
tions have been presented of the significance of 
environmentalism. Individuals and social actors 
like political parties, bureaucracies and interest 
groups have expressed concern about the environ­
ment for a variety of reasons. Established organisa­
tions have been highly selective in plundering the 
green agenda. Moreover, they have been extremely 
cautious about embracing aspects of environmen­
talism that may undermine economic imperatives 
and electoral considerations. Commitment to envi­
ronmentalism can also be expressed with different 
levels of intensity and in a variety of ways. Radical 
environmentalism, for instance, may include the 
preoccupation by ‘deep ecologists’ with a non- 
anthropocentric perspective as well as militant op­
position to established institutions by groups like 
Greenpeace.
Though environmentalism can mean different 
things to different people, there are some common 
preoccupations and patterns of behaviour. The 
latter are distinctive enough to suggest that envi­
ronmental issues will feature strongly on the politi­
cal agenda in the 1990s. This argument may appear 
less plausible in the current economic situation, 
where people are concerned about issues like unem­
ployment, the goods and services tax and the pros­
pects for economic growth. However, there is indi­
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is unlikely to diminish. Furthermore, though the 
survey noted only modest changes in behaviour by 
consumers and a lack of emphasis on fundamental 
issues like reducing the use of domestic appliances 
and of motor vehicles, key social actors have be­
come aware of the need to modify behaviour through 
a variety of means, including both state interven­
tion and market mechanisms.
Media reportage has often portrayed the rela­
tionship between environmentalism and develop­
ment as one of fundamental conflict and division.
It is easy to contrast the warnings of catastrophists 
like David Suzuki (who posit a fundamental con­
flict between the pursuit of profit and power and the 
destruction of nature) with the prognosis of 
comucopians like Hugh Morgan from the Western
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rect support tor my argument from a recent study, 
commissioned by the Secretariat of the Ecologi­
cally Sustainable Development Working Groups. 
The study, conducted during the worst recession 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s, asked 
people to rank which issues were among the most 
important now and which would be the most im­
portant in ten years’ time. In rank order the most 
important current issues were unemployment, fol­
lowed by the environment and education. Most 
people felt that in ten years’ time the most impor­
tant issue would be the environment, followed by 
unemployment and pensions and care for the aged.
The dangers of try ing to predict pol itical change 
are well-known. However, the evidence suggests 
that the preoccupation with environmental issues
tatastpopttsts
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Mining Corporation (who regard environmental­
ism as a means to an end for ambitious, power 
seeking revolutionaries aiming to undermine pri­
vate property).
However, these characterisations, though par­
tially accurate, are too inflexible and fail to account 
for the impact of more consensual studies like the 
Brundtland Report presented by the United Na­
tions World Commission on Environment and 
Development on business and environmental 
groups. Though fraught with difficulties, initiatives 
like the ecologically sustainable working groups 
and the Resource Assessment Commission have 
led to a dialogue between catastrophists and 
cornucopians which has led many of them to aban­
don entrenched positions and much of their ideo­
logical baggage. Many business groups have recog­
nised, reluctantly, that some form of statutory in­
tervention is necessary to address many environ­
mental problems and that, whether they like it or 
not, they have to become more socially responsible 
(for instance, in rehabilitating landscapes after 
■ they have been mined). Even more striking has 
been the acknowledgment by environmentalists 
that market mechanisms may have an important 
role to play in contributing to environmental pro­
tection and that there are many ways in which 
economic activity is independent of the consump­
tion of energy and of resources, for instance, through 
recycling of products and through ‘closed loop’ 
production processes (as in the design of cars and 
other goods so that all their components can easily 
recycled). Moreover, although structural impera­
tives like the need for economic growth in capital­
ist society and the struggles for electoral power 
between political parties may make it difficult to 
introduce radical reforms in environmental policy, 
these forces can be challenged and subjected to 
considerable modification.
But is the challenge of environmentalism to 
established practices novel or more ordinary? The 
arguments for novelty are based largely on an 
idealist tradition that emphasises the role of ideas 
in bringing about social change. According to this 
view there has been a shift, particularly among 
certain social groups, from materialist to 
postmaterialist values, from a way of thinking which 
is primarily guided by the aim of economic growth 
through exploitation of resources to one which 
values the environment for its aesthetic, spiritual 
and other qualities.
Arguments for the ordinariness of the chal­
lenge derive mainly from a realist tradition that 
emphasises interestsand power. Despite theirrheto- 
ric, it is obvious that neither environmental groups 
nor political parties are simply motivated by ideal­
ism. They are also preoccupied by their own sur­
vival as organisations and are acutely aware of their 
own interests as well as of the need to appeal to 
particular groups and to engage in struggles for
power and influence. Moreover, the success of a 
social movement can often best be gauged by the 
extent to which its ideals have been incorporated 
by established groups or by its inclusion in regular 
processes of negotiation and intermediation. There 
is no necessary conflict between the promotion by 
a social movement of certain ideals and its maturity 
as an organisation.
Environmental movements have been highly 
successful in promoting their ideals. First, they have 
been able to utilise a rich tradition of ideas about 
nature and environmental protection. Second, they 
have drawn on similar social bases and ideas as the 
protest movements of the 1960s. Though there is no 
necessary connection between concern about the 
environment and support for other social move­
ments, the emphasis on economic growth by estab­
lished parties in western democracies after the sec­
ond World War provided new movements with a 
unique chance to mobilise popular support around 
the issue of environmental protection.
The notions of progress and of harnessing natu­
ral resources for economic development gained 
widespread acceptance in the wake of the first 
Industrial Revolution. The forces most closely asso­
ciated with this Great Transformation— labourand 
business as well as the political parties attempting to 
represent their interests—have therefore been re­
garded by many as incapable of dealing with the 
new emphasis on environmentalism in the late 
20th century. Third, environmental movements 
have been successful in promoting their ideals be­
cause they have operated as effective organisations 
for mobilising people and for raising funds. A  fur­
ther indicatorof the influence of environmentalism 
has been the level of funding allocated by govern­
ment both to voluntary organisations and to its own 
environmental agencies even during periods of 
economic decline.
Paradoxically, the acceptance of their ideas by 
the mass public and by key groups in society (in­
cluding many of their opponents in business and 
industry) has posed a serious difficulty for environ­
mental groups. Their identity as an oppositional 
force has seriously been compromised. Yet, many 
environmentalists are realising that it is not simply 
a question of ‘sleeping with the enemy’. Environ­
mentalists and developers have had to adapt to 
changing political circumstances and to respond to 
new insights into the relationship between envi­
ronmental protection and economic development.
The struggle over the coming decade is likely to 
be less over whether or not environmentalism be­
comes an integral part of the political and business 
culture— that is already well advanced—but over 
the implementation of radical reforms. Environ­
mental groups will still play a role in placing pres­
sure on established organisations to carry out re­
forms. However, with the focus on implementa­
tion, it is more likely than in the past that the main
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struggles will take place at two levels. The first will 
be between established organisations with experi­
ence in the political system and a strategic role in 
implementing public policy. The second will be 
between nation states or groups of nation states.
On the first level of conflict, established organi­
sations will continue to differ in the emphasis they 
place on the implementation of environmental 
policies. Over the past decade we have witnessed 
numerous environmental initiatives by the Labor 
government like the protection of rainforests, the 
high profile of the Environment portfolio and the 
funding of the landcare program. The public has 
also acknowledged the clear difference in emphasis 
by the major parties on the implementation of 
environmental policies. Yet while there are indica­
tions that a change of regime to a Coalition govern­
ment led by John Hewson would result in a signifi­
cant change of emphasis, many of the long-term 
goals would remain the same. Even in countries led 
by conservative governments for about a decade or 
more, such as Germany and Britain, there has been 
a major shift to incorporate environmental con­
cerns both into political institutions and business 
practices.
This is not to suggest at the relationship be­
tween environmentalists and established institu­
tions will always be characterised by co-operation. 
Conflicts will persist, particularly over the pace of 
implementation. However, even during recessions 
the environment will feature prominently on the 
political agenda, because it is often compatible with 
development. In addition, it is widely recognised 
that problems like the depletion of the ozone layer, 
soil degradation and the emission of greenhouse 
gases either have or could have a major effect on 
economic development.
Some of these issues also relate to the second 
level of conflict—conflict between nation states. A 
serious problem of the recent United Nations Con­
ference in Rio de J aneiro was to try to reconcile the 
divergent perspectives of developed and develop- ■ 
ing countries. The economic implications of envi­
ronmental protection are particularly acute for the 
latter. The agenda in this sphere will be dominated 
by arguments over who should pay for environmen­
tal protection and over what developing countries 
see as hypocrisy of developed nations that consume 
a disproportionate share of resources and expect 
developing countries to take drastic measures to 
save the environment.
There is also a potential tension between envi­
ronmentalism in the developed world and the needs 
for survival and improvement of material condi­
tions in developing nations. The goals of environ­
mentalists in the West may also clash with the 
policies of particular regimes in developing coun­
tries. For instance, environmentalists and trade 
unionists in Australia have attempted to prevent 
the trade with countries like Malaysia in rainforest
timbers.
Another dimension of international conflicts 
lies in the different positions adopted by major 
powers or trading blocs on environmental issues, as 
illustrated by the divergent positions of the United 
States and the European Community over the sign­
ing of international treaties on the emission of 
carbon dioxide, over aid programs to developing 
countries and over the regulation species protec­
tion (‘biodiversity’). Over the coming decade there 
are likely to be greater efforts at the transnational 
level to tackle the varying commitment by nation 
states to environmental protection. There is a grow­
ing realisation that national governments are not 
only having great difficulty in dealing with interna­
tional economic problems but also with environ­
mental ones.
The initial experiments with change are likely 
to be conducted at the national level, especially 
where laws and institutional mechanisms are being 
established to address environmental problems. As 
I have suggested above, significant progress has 
been made in Australia in identifying key issues. 
Furthermore, over certain issues, the patterns of 
response by established and environmental organi­
sations have been remarkably similar. Finally, the 
notion that policy decisions, even economic ones, 
- should be informed by an analysis of impacts on the 
environment has taken hold both of the popular 
imagination and of the bureaucratic and political 
culture.
It is no longer a question of whether or not one 
sleeps with ‘the enemy’. Though they now rub 
shoulders with the establishment, the Greens have 
contributed to significant changes within it. They 
are also well aware of the dangers of becoming 
marginalised in debates about environmental pro­
tection. ■
ELIM PAPADAKIS is professor of sociology at 
the University of New England. This article is 
based on his forthcoming book, Politics and the 
Environment: The Australian Experience (Allen 
and Unwin, 1993).
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ALR ACRONYMS WINNER
The winner of the ALR  Acronyms competition in our 
December issue was S Cheung of Killara, NSW, for ‘A 
Little Revisionism’. Among the other highly commended 
entries were ‘After Lenin Rotted’, ‘Australia’s Left Ration­
alists’, ‘Australian Left’s Rigormortis’ and ‘Apparatchiks’ 
Literary Raft’. Definitely no prizes, however, either for ‘A 
Lovely Read’, or ‘A Load of Rubbish’. A voucher for $300 
worth of Pluto Press books is winging its way to S Cheung.
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WORKING
HOLI DAY
High unem- 
ployment 
doesn’t 
cause the 
anger it 
once did. 
Jocelyn 
Pixley 
thinks that 
‘postindustrial' 
ism’ is at 
least partly 
to blame. 
She argues 
that before 
we invent a 
future ‘be­
yond work’ 
we need a 
future with 
work.
I
f the government loses power at the forth­
coming federal election, mass unemployment 
will be one of the primary factors in its demise. 
Labor’s 1983 commitment to ‘Jobs, Jobs, Jobs’ 
now looks very hollow. Many of the policy changes 
of the past decade such as workplace restructuring, 
enhanced freedom of capital movements and wage- 
squeezing under the Accords did, for a time, buy a 
high level of job-growth—albeit mainly service- 
oriented and often part-time. But nothing much 
has withstood the effects of long-term global reces­
sion on Australia. In 1993, unemployment levels 
of over 11% may well be politically unacceptable. 
But 20 years ago such rates were unthinkable. 
Since 1945 most people had believed that mass 
unemployment would never return. What hap­
pened to that belief?
The idea that ‘industrial society’ is dead cer­
tainly predates chronic unemployment, but it cap­
tured a much larger audience as the 1970s reces­
sion developed. The postindustrial analysis was 
not only a plausible description of economic 
trends—away from manufacturing employment 
and towards the service sector—but it also offered 
hope. A new belief emerged, far from the limited 
ambitions of job creation schemes, a belief in a 
potentially different era ‘beyond employment’. 
There was no need to be as alarmed by mass 
unemployment as in the 1930s, because the ‘cure’ 
no longer lay in jobs. Barry Jones wanted sleepers 
to wake up to the future of work; at a 1980 confer­
ence in Canberra, the conspicuously employed 
worried themselves over the topic 'When Ma­
chines Replace People. What W ill People Do?’; 
Andr£ Gorz described the Paths to Paradise as the 
Liberation from Work. Postindustrial terms like the 
‘information age’, cybernetic or service society and 
the critique of ‘productivism’ were drawn upon in 
the emerging Green politics.
By equating productivism with participation, 
chronic unemployment could be regarded as ben­
eficial, because the frugal simplicity enjoyed by the 
jobless indicated the path the whole world must 
take, away from consumerism and polluting facto­
ries. These ideas were widely disseminated by the 
early Green movement. Rather than leading to 
depression, unemployment would be the basis of 
utopia.
According to postindustrialists in the Left, the 
condition of being employed, so long feted as the 
norm, should be rejected in favour of revaluing 
other kinds of work and removing the stigma of 
dependency. The time (recession) was ripe for the 
separation of income from work, through the life­
time provision of an income guaranteed by the state 
and by seeking alternatives to wage labour (self- 
help). Thus mass unemployment could even be 
welcomed and ecologically destructive economic 
growth could possibly be halted as well.
These hopes have contributed to the wide­
spread indifference towards chronic unemployment. 
Those who would otherwise be more likely to be 
sympathetic to the unemployed have instead imag­
ined that a positive future of creative work and 
income security for all will emerge from this gloom. 
Meaningless jobs will be replaced by co-operative
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harmony, informal bartering of skills and produce, 
and networks of communes and self-help teams. 
Men will join women in a revaluing of traditional 
domestic work.
This apparently attractive vision is in my view 
gravely mistaken. Not only has it left the field to 
punitive neoliberal views, a problem in itself, but it 
has also held out the hope that there might be ‘soft 
options’ available to tackle chronic unemploy­
ment. These post industrial soft options, however, 
have been rapidly transformed into harsh ones 
which have left the unemployed even more 
marginalised than before. Apart from economic 
liberals who welcome the capacity of unemploy­
ment to control workers and drive down wages, 
there are many who worry about unemployment 
but cannot see any genuinely new sources of jobs. 
How many really believe that a GST here or a new 
railroad there will have any significant effect? 
Many believe that microchips and robots have 
irrevocably destroyed industrial jobs; hence the 
tinkering offered by political parties is completely 
unconvincing. This cultural malaise about em­
ployment silences any hint of a Keynesian revival. 
Mass unemployment today appears quite different
to that of previous periods. This time, there is little 
confidence that jobs will eventually return.
Instead, many find the postindustrial description 
of long-term trends much more persuasive. The first 
trend is the permanent decline and relocation of 
manufacturing jobs—the male ‘Fordist’ life-cycle is 
over. The second trend is the rise in service employ­
ment and a massive growth of female, part-time 
employment. Two interpretations of such trends 
suggest themselves—either we could move, like the 
USA, to a situation of ‘junk jobs’ with a permanent 
‘underclass’, or to more ‘woman-friendly’ service 
and environmental forms of employment.
The description is convincing enough, but the 
conclusion often drawn—that we should abandon 
any search for new jobs— is far more questionable. 
The stress on a ‘post-employment’ society by 
progressives like Keane, Block, Offe and Jordan 
rejects any potential path to new forms of employ­
ment. This position, however, ends up with re­
sponses like those of economic liberals. A kind of 
convergence has occurred between the post industrial 
search for ‘nonemployment’ and the neoliberal view 
of unemployment, which sees large numbers of job­
less primarily as a means of bringing down wages.
Life after work: 
kids at a Sydney 
soup kitchen
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convergence has occurred between the 
postindustrial search for ‘nonemployment’ and the 
neoliberal view of unemployment, which sees large 
numbers of jobless primarily as a means of bringing 
down wages.
The postindustrial position appears at first sight 
to offer the exact opposite to a cheap labour force 
disciplined by a large pool of jobless, because the 
postindustrial proposals are based on the expecta­
tion that ‘nonemployment’ will radically under­
mine or subvert the conventional employment sys­
tem. But this distinction depends on three major 
assumptions. The first is that a policy that aimed at 
separating income from work would be properly 
implemented by governments. That is, successive 
governments are expected to act benignly (and 
generously) in implementing a guaranteed income 
scheme and in supporting alternatives to conven­
tional jobs. The second assumption is that markets 
generally would decline in importance if large num­
bers of people were engaged in non-market activi­
ties. Third, the allegedly subversive nature of the 
postindustrial strategy draws on the counter-cul­
ture experiments of the 1960s which rejected wage 
labour. The distinction between the neoliberal 
view and the post industrial one depends on whether 
these three assumptions are well founded and, in my 
opinion, they are not.
Postindustrialists claim they are defending the 
unemployed by providing conditions that would 
challenge the prevailing system and overturn the 
present stigma and punishment meted out to the 
unemployed. For post-industrialists it is futile and 
undesirable to pursue job creation on the grounds 
that employment is a mere discipline that prevents 
wider democratic participation for various reasons. 
Employment for them is unrelated to citizenship, 
because universal civil, political and social rights 
should be safeguarded by governments and in the 
securing of these rights, formal participation in paid 
work is irrelevant, even counter-productive.
Yet some governments have actually aimed to 
implement postindustrial schemes, while in no way 
according with the postindustrial challenge to sub­
vert the economic order. In a situation of rising 
welfare payments for the unemployed, governments 
have been more concerned to reduce these budgets. 
Accordingly, several governments have transformed 
ideas for guaranteed incomes, communes, worker 
co-operatives and ‘informal work’ into means of 
further marginalising those excluded from the la­
bour market. They have used the schemes to legiti­
mate their own failures to ameliorate the level of 
unemployment. More seriously, they have used 
them to render marginal categories even more 
powerless by withdrawing the possibility for the 
excluded to make full claims for citizen rights.
A guaranteed income scheme was nearly intro­
duced in the US by President Nixon with the aim 
of reducing female welfare claimants and to force
male black populations into low paid sectors of the 
labour market. In New Zealand, in the late 1980s, 
a ‘compensation’ to offset the previous Labour gov­
ernment’s GST operated as a ‘guaranteed income’ 
for those on welfare or low wages. It lasted until the 
1990 National government cut cash payments and 
reduced wages further with the Employment Con­
tracts Legislation. This four-year provision was 
hardly an income guarantee of a lifetime. Similar 
problems lay behind the feminist movement’s re­
jection of the idea of wages for housework.
In Australia, although the Hawke government 
insisted that it was committed to full employment, 
part of this commitment was directed towards a 
postindustrial pursuit of ‘alternatives to paid work’ 
(Hawke’s phrase). Young unemployed were to learn 
how to survive on communes in the bush, and 
redundant workers were offered the opportunity to 
use their own savings to purchase their jobs and 
convert them into worker co-operatives. Rather 
than promoting a post-industrial vision, such ‘alter­
natives’ only served to remove the existing defences 
of the unemployed, and to trim welfare budgets.
Hence, governments have taken up 
postindustrial plans for quite different motivations, 
and yet the differences are almost imperceptible at 
the policy level. More seriously the actual plans 
often led to further punishment for those unable to 
find work.
The question about policy responses to unem­
ployment, then, is whether there is an alternative to 
wage labour that does not seriously weaken the 
citizenship of whole categories of the population. 
The answer is that it seems highly improbable that 
there is. The second assumption is that markets in 
general will decline in importance with reduced 
labour force participation. A new economic sector 
will develop as a ‘third way’ (neither state-run nor 
capitalist) causing the scope of markets to shrink.
In Third World countries, where labour and 
commodity markets are far less developed, the in­
ternational markets have inordinate influence. But 
even the most powerful governments do not neces­
sarily attempt to confront these markets unless they 
are faced with electoral and other costs. In this, 
Australia is of course a marginal player, for govern­
mental intervention in the markets has been in­
creasingly limited by long-term global develop­
ments.
This contemporary situation is one where the 
corporate ‘citizens’ of the world are in a position to 
pick and choose where the cheapest labour and 
land may be found, limited only by pockets of 
nation-state resistance and relatively weak interna­
tional bodies like human rights and environmental 
bodies and the International Labour Organisation. 
For a semi-peripheral nation like Australia to search 
for alternatives to market participation in such a 
climate is to ignore these trends of global concen­
tration, which are getting more powerful, not less.
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The question of defending a new form of full em­
ployment in Australia is more difficult again, and 
could only make headway if there were interna­
tional moves in this direction. But there is no 
foundation to the idea that people or groups can 
survive ‘outside the market’ in this situation. Where 
it was once possible to subsist by avoiding the 
markets as much as possible, the small-scale units of 
production and available land required fora return 
to widespread self-sufficiency no longer exist.
Rather, it is only possible to set up a worker co­
operative or move to a commune if capital, skills, 
tools, materials and land are available. In this re­
spect these alternatives are no different to other 
small businesses or farms. Furthermore, alternative 
structures of work do not necessarily render the 
state more accountable, or put any controls on the 
markets, even when they are more internally demo­
cratic than conventional places of employment. 
Even though the principle of co-operation is exem­
plary, those with the least resources are least likely 
to be attracted to a fledgling alternative, for they 
have the most to lose. France and Italy have the 
most developed co-operative sector, by contrast, 
Australia hasaco-operativetraditionofrecessionary 
failures.
The other assumption of advocates of an era 
‘beyond employment’ concerns the counter-cul­
ture’s rejection of wage labour. According to 
postindustrialists, the counter-culture showed that 
altemativestowagelabourcouldhavearadicalising 
potential. When imposed by governments from 
above, this is obviously a questionable assumption. 
But even the counter-culture itself became less 
‘subversive’ as time went on. This was pointed out 
at the time, in Australia, in a debate between 
Dennis Altman and the New Left.
Although Altman was enthusiastic in the 1960s 
about the potential for cultural change, he quickly 
realised that the segment of the counter-culture 
which chose the self-marginalisation of rural com­
mune life quickly became quiescent. The radical 
potential remained with the other elements of the 
counter-culture which turned to the feminist, gay 
and green movements. Nowadays, the commune 
movement in Australia is more accurately termed 
an ‘alternative life-style’. It did increase the choice 
of available different ways of life, particularly for 
men, but those who chose to live on communes 
were mostly a social elite who possessed the cultural 
capital to return to conventional work if they wished. 
And, of course, communes are not in themselves 
self-sufficient.
The Australian experience of attempts to im­
pose worker co-operatives and communes from 
above has been an entirely paternalistic one. Re­
dundant workers did not wish to lose their lay-off 
Pay in trying to manage the democratic structures of 
bodies which mostly lasted for less than a year. In 
reality they were passive clients who were to be
educated in the skills of co-operation and who had 
to make constant appeals to the government for 
more money. Those involved in promoting co-ops 
were themselves divided about the most suitable 
structures. The teenagers who were to be moved to 
communes were not interested in learning about 
an alternative lifestyle: they wanted conventional 
jobs. This is not to say that more democratic work 
structures are unimportant, but rather that they 
should not be imposed from above, in times of 
recession, on those with the least material and 
cultural resources for survival, as an alternative to 
vigorous and effective employment policies.
In short, while the intellectual climate that 
fostered a postindustrial era ‘beyond employment’ 
explicitly rejected neoliberalism, the assumptions 
it makes about paid employment have nothing to 
say which can be set as an alternative to the 
strictures of economic liberalism on employment 
policy. The postindustrial search for ‘alternatives’ 
has fostered a belief that mass unemployment need 
not be solved in the conventional way. But there 
do not seem to be any ‘alternative’ utopias arising 
out of our existing unemployment mess. Of course, 
it can still be argued by postindustrialists that 
defending dull, powerless, paid work is inimical to 
the ideal of human emancipation. But the onus is 
also on the proponents of ‘alternatives’ to prove 
that neglecting to press for initiatives to increase 
conventional employment will not make the situ­
ation worse.
Finally, a word about the advantages of full­
time employment, something seldom heard these 
days. In modem life a secure job does provide a 
source of identity—which is obviously of greater 
satisfaction when it is not dull. The question of 
dullness and skill are, however, often political 
issues about the capacity to define skill, working 
conditions and social usefulness. Paid employment 
may seem an onerous imposition, but it also pro­
vides a sense of fulfilment and of contributing to 
the social whole. It also offers protection against 
client status: to withdraw from work for various 
reasons of one’s own choosing is different from 
being permanently excluded from employment. 
(A part-time job, meanwhile, involves a part-time 
wage—meaning, usually, poverty.) People who 
have spent at least some of their lives in paid 
employment are those whose rights are more safe­
guarded by virtue of the obligations they have been 
able, ideally, to assume freely in that employment.
In short, gaining access to one of the key 
modem arenas of social participation, the world of 
paid work, is more a beginning than an end. ■
JOCELYN PIXLEY teaches in the school of 
sociology at the University of NSW . This article 
is based on her Citizenship and Employment: 
Investigating Post-Industrial Options, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993.
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As the 
neoliberal tide 
of the 80s 
recedes it 
becomes 
clear that its 
legacy is still 
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one. NIKOLAS 
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ways in which 
economic lib­
eralism has 
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altered the 
face of politi­
cal life.
■  JU8T SAY NEO
Neoliberalism, economic liberalism, ‘eco­nomic rationalism’: the terms evoke im­ages of harsh, rightwing dogma and ‘scorched earth’ politics. To some extent 
these images are an accurate reflection of an 
existing and emerging reality. But in crucial 
respects they are misleading. Like the early AIDS 
campaign ‘grim reaper’ images, they frighten the 
children but don’t provide a clear picture of the 
subject at hand.
Following the excellent lead in recent issues 
of ALR by Graham Burchell (ALR 144) and 
Mitchell Dean (ALR 145), we aim here to further 
elaborate neoliberalism. While we see 
neoliberalism as an increasingly successful tech­
nology of government, we certainly do not argue 
that ALR readers should embrace it. The policy 
consequences of neoliberalism are, in the main, 
anathema to those committed to the civilised 
social policy outcomes associated with social 
democracy/social liberalism for most of this cen­
tury.
In other words, we treat the neoliberalism 
seriously as an influential technology of govern­
ment, but we eschew both the fantasy of the 
Right, that neoliberalism is messianic, and the 
fantasy of the Left, that it is an invading force 
whose rumbling trucks somehow magically at­
tract erstwhile socialists keen to ‘sell out’. Here 
we want to present a picture of neoliberalism in 
practice in Britain and to briefly suggest the 
extent to which neoliberalism has and has not 
influenced government in Australia.
Neoliberalism is less a revolution in govern­
ment than a reorganisation of political reason 
that brings it into a kind of alignment with the 
technologies of government that have been tak­
ing shape in liberal polities over the last two 
centuries. The new political initiatives of 
neoliberalism certainly often take the form of the 
attempt to make entities autonomous from the 
state, or rather, to make the state autonomous 
from direct controls over, and responsibility for, 
the actions and calculations of businesses, wel­
fare organisations and so forth. But these 
reorganisations of government are not intelligi­
ble in terms of a simple opposition of the inter­
ventionist to a non-interventionist state. Rather, 
they entail the adoption by the central state of a 
range of different devices which seek both to 
create a distance between the formal institutions 
of the state and other social actors, and to act 
upon them in a different manner.
Consider the fact that in both Britain and 
Australia over the past ten years social security 
mechanisms (and especially those dealing with 
the unemployed) have introduced more and more 
measures to separate themselves as formal state 
institutions from the ‘clients’ (especially the un­
employed). Rules regarding eligibility for ben­
efits have been tightened and ‘special treatment’ 
procedures (for example for unemployed profes­
sionals) have been scrapped.
The rise and fall of Margaret Thatcher in 
Britain provides several crucial elements to an 
understanding of the nature of neoliberalism, 
especially its differences with liberal social de­
mocracy. Some commentators regarded the com­
ing to power of Margaret Thatcher in Britain, 
and Ronald Reagan in the United States, as a 
‘counter-revolution’ against the politics of post­
war liberal democratic society. Perhaps it was. 
But we need to ascertain what this counter­
revolution was if we are to be able to assess it. The 
new political climate was certainly marked by 
the rise of a set of political ideals articulated in a 
neoliberal vocabulary, and a range of programs 
for transforming the ways in which economic, 
social and personal life were to be regulated. As 
is well known, neoliberalism articulates itself in 
terms of profound hostility to the ‘intervention­
ist’ state.
While, for some 30 years following the publi­
cation of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom in 1944, 
this hostility seemed eccentric to the main lines 
of political debate, from the mid 70s onwards, in 
Britain, the United States and Australia, the 
rhetoric of neoliberalism began to underpin the 
appeal of conservative political programs and 
pronouncements. In Britain, the manifesto pro­
duced by the Conservative Party prior to their 
victory in the general election of 1979 presented 
some of its key proposals in these terms. And, 
after her election, Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher became the most eloquent spokesper­
son for a politics against the state:
the first principle of this government...is to 
revive a sense of individual responsibility.
It is to reinvigorate not just the economy 
and industry but the whole body of volun­
tary associations, loyalties and activities 
which gives society its richness and diver­
sity, and hence its real strength...Since 
Burke’s time the activities of the State have 
pene trated almost every aspect of life.. .The
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trouble is that when the State becomes 
involved in every strike, price or contract 
affecting a nationalised industry, its au­
thority is not enhanced, it isdiminished...In 
our party we do not ask for a feeble State.
On the contrary, we need a strong State to 
preserve both liberty and order...to main­
tain in good repair the frame which sur­
rounds society. But the frame should not be 
so heavy or elaborate as to dominate the 
whole picture...We should not expect the 
State to appear in the guise of an extrava­
gant good fairy at every christening, a lo­
quacious and tedious companion at every 
stage of life’s journey, the unknown mourner 
at every funeral.
Neoliberal political rhetoric thus breaks with 
the assumptions, explanations and vocabularies 
of the field of political discourse mapped out by 
liberal social democracy. Against the assumption 
that the ills of social and economic life are to be 
addressed by the activities of government, it 
deploys theories of government ‘oveneach’ and 
‘overload’. It counterposes the inefficiencies of 
planned economies to the strength of the market 
in picking winners. It claims that Keynesian 
demand management sets in motion a vicious 
spiral of inflationary expectations and cunency 
debasement. And it follows the Austrian thinker 
Joseph Schumpeter in suggesting that big govern­
ment is not only inefficient but malign.
According to this view, because parties have 
to compete for votes, they are pushed into mak­
ing lavish promises to the electorate, fuelling 
rising expectations which can only be met by 
public borrowing on a grand scale. Further, be­
cause of the reliance of ‘the welfare state’ on 
bureaucracy, it is subject to constant pressure 
from bureaucrats to expand their own empires, 
again fuelling an expensive and inefficient ex­
tension of the governmental machine. Because it 
cultivates expectations that it is the role of the 
state to provide for the individual, the welfare 
state has a morally damaging effect upon citizens, 
producing expectations that government will do 
what only individuals actually can, engendering 
a ‘culture of dependency’.
The boundaries of the state are to be rolled 
back; society is to be made innovative, produc­
tive and fulfilled through ‘entrepreneurship’. The 
vocabulary of enterprise certainly has an eco­
nomic reference, but its scope runs far wider. 
Neoliberalism argues that an economy structured 
in the form of relations of exchange between 
discrete economic units pursuing their undertak­
ings with confidence and energy will produce the 
most social goods and distribute them in the 
manner most advantageous to each and to all. 
But that is not all: the rhetoric of enterprise also 
provides a rationale for the structuring of the lives 
of individual citizens and families. Individuals are 
to become entrepreneurs of themselves, shaping 
their own lives through the choices they make, 
striving to fulfil their aims. Families are to pursue 
their own ambitions, to take decisions as to their 
priorities and endeavour to maximise their own 
quality of life.
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Not that the state has no part to play. The 
state must, first and foremost, be strong to defend 
the interests of the nation in the international 
sphere. The state also has a domestic role to play 
in providing a legal framework for social and 
economic life, and in ensuring public order. But 
within this framework autonomous actors— com­
mercial concerns, families, individuals—are to 
go freely about their business, making their own 
decisions and controlling their own destinies. 
Many find in this emphasis on a more than 
minimal state in the rhetoric and programs of the 
new right a contradiction with the classical doc­
trines of neoliberalism. With degrees of strin­
gency varying between Nozick, Hayek and 
Friedman, neoliberal philosophies agonise over 
how minimal the role of the state should be, 
though none argue for its strength.
But neoliberalism as a political ‘rationality’ is 
not equivalent to neoliberalism as a political 
philosophy—a rationality combines philosophi­
cal themes with those taken from elsewhere. 
Here a rhetoric of the nation, the family, the 
virtues of law and order, and the respect for 
tradition serves to align neoliberalism with tradi­
tional rightwing values, and simultaneously to 
open up a space for the elaboration of govern­
mental programs.
Most of these elements of neoliberalism, as 
we hinted above, have applied just as much to 
Hawke’s and Keating’s Australia as to Thatcher’s 
and Major’s Britain. The rationalities and the 
philosophies of neoliberalism are definitely be­
coming part of mainstream political life in this 
country. However, the situation in Australia is 
quite different from that in Britain when the style 
of governing economic life is central to 
neoliberalism.
For neoliberalism any techniques of economic 
regulation must be concerned with the ‘autonomy’ 
of private enterprise. Neoliberals claim that these 
techniques are especially efficient because they 
operate by handling the multiplicity of tiny deci­
sions and choices that constitute economic activ­
ity and which exceed the scope of even the most 
megalomaniac planner. And they question the 
possibility of the state establishing ‘what is really 
going on’ in terms of the division of state and civil 
society or state and market. However, while the 
programmatic language within which they first 
emerged might have deplored planning, these 
techniques themselves seek to govern economic 
actors through shaping their autonomous deci­
sions. Crucial to this process is the emergence of 
managers committed to intellectual and 
calculative methods by virtue of their training 
and professional allegiances, capable of acting as 
relays between national economic objectives and 
the everyday activities of industry.
This style is much more influential in na­
tional government circles in Britain than it is in 
Australia. While the British government contin­
ues to deny the need for a formal prices and 
incomes policy and to reject direct negotiations 
with the nation’s peak union body, for instance, 
Australian national government has been built 
around the Accord, featuring direct negotiations 
with the ACTU, since 1983. The British exam­
ple is certainly being followed here, but only so far 
at the level of state governments such as V ictoria. 
If the federal Coalition wins the forthcoming 
election, of course the above elaboration of the 
neoliberal style of governing economic life will 
almost certainly have to be applied to the na­
tional sphere as well as these states, and the 
Australian situation will much more closely re­
semble the British one.
None of the above is to say that a neoliberal 
polity like Britain is without a ‘macroeconomic 
policy’, a set of aspirations and programs for 
acting upon the economic life of the nation in 
order to promote desired economic ends. One 
strand of this policy is a range of diverse strategies 
to create and sustain a ‘market’, to reshape the 
forms of economic exchange in the direction of 
contractual exchange. Another takes the form of 
attempts at creating autonomy from (or for) ‘the 
centre’. The first programs for this project sought 
to achieve it by ‘hiving off responsibilities to 
local authorities, nationalised industries, employ­
ers and unions. These were to function within a 
macroeconomic framework with an emphasis on 
reducing the public Sector Borrowing Require­
ment, limiting public expenditure, and shifting 
from direct to indirect taxation.
The strategy here was to marginalise the 
problems stemming from macroeconomic poli­
cies, as well as to increase the influence of local 
citizens, consumers and union members over their 
respective organisations. As macroeconomic 
problems grew, these economic failures were at­
tributed to the resistance to economic change 
mounted by powerful interest groups and institu­
tions. So neoliberalism altered its strategy, seek­
ing new ways to bolster the autonomy of the 
central state by changing the power networks 
within which these resisting organisations and 
institutions operated. Hence, while monetarism 
began life as a technique for taking policy deci­
sions out of politics, making them ‘automatic’, it 
ended as a mechanism for re-establishing the role 
of politicians, enabling them to wield influence 
over employment levels and the like by decisions 
controllable by central governments.
The privatisation programs of the new 
neoliberal politics have formed perhaps its most 
visible strand, and one most aligned with the 
political ideals of market versus state. Cutting 
free utilities such as (in Britain) gas, phone and 
water, business such as the car and armaments
'Neollberalism 
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industries, and organisations such as airlines from 
the ‘dead hand’ of ‘state control’ holds out the 
promise of killing many birds with one stone. To 
neoliberals it realises money to the central ex­
chequer, frees the taxpayer from the burden of 
supporting unprofitable enterprises, exposes these 
businesses to the invigorating discipline of com­
petition as well as the bottomless resources of the 
money markets, and generalises share ownership 
thereby linking citizens into the social body as 
owners rather than as subjects. We can certainly 
query whether the enterprises so freed were in­
deed unprofitable to begin with, and whether the 
quasi-monopolies that have in some cases been 
created do not even allow us the pleasure of 
empirically testing the supposed virtues of the 
market. Yet the transformation in the balance of 
political forces inaugurated by these programs 
and their enactment should not be underesti­
mated.
In terms of economic regulations at least, a 
rigid distinction between nationalised and pri­
vate enterprises is misleading. On the one hand, 
the degree of political direction over the activi­
ties of nationalised companies is variable but 
small— perhaps the principal form of interven­
tion is or was the provision or refusal of invest­
ment capital. On the other hand, private sector 
enterprise is open to the many strictly speaking 
non-market mechanisms that have proliferated 
in advanced liberal democracies, with the rise of 
managers as an intermediary between expert 
knowledge, economic policy and business deci­
sions. Of course, ‘market forces’ intersect in dif­
ferent ways with investment decisions and the 
like when businesses are no longer formally owned 
by the state, as do the imperatives to profit. But 
this reconstruction of the form of economic regu­
lation is less a revolution against the failure of 
central planning than a recognition of the diffi­
culty of constructing a centrally planned economy, 
of the illusions of knowledge and power that such 
rationalities embodied.
Another central programmatic plank of the 
new neoliberal rationality is hostility to ‘interme­
diate institutions’. These are centres of institu­
tional power distinct from the central state yet 
not apparently subject to the disciplines of the 
market. The attack on the power of the trade 
unions, the attempt to transform local govern­
ment, hostility to ‘quangos’—all these appear, on 
the surface, to be of a piece. In Britain, some 
intermediate institutions have been abolished— 
most notably the Greater London Council— 
while others have had their powers transferred 
from the periphery to the centre, as in the reduc­
tion of the autonomy of local authorities. But 
most significant has been the creation of a new 
intermediate space, neither private nor public, 
for the operation of regulatory bodies.
In Britain this has taken two forms. The first 
is the statutory creation of self-regulatory bodies 
operating within a framework of law. One exam­
ple of such an arrangement is the establishment 
of a Securities and Investment Board under the 
Financial Services Act. The SIB will have sub­
stantial powers to authorise or refuse investment 
activity, thus possibly putting firms out of busi­
ness. It will further delegate responsibility to five 
other self-regulating organisations responsible for 
various sectors of the financial services industry. 
These will have considerable powers, the Secu­
rity Association responsible for the London Stock 
Exchange having an enforcement division of 120 
with powers to seize documents and interrogate 
employees.
A second form of intermediate institution 
that has thrived within neoliberal government is 
a version of what has been temied ‘private inter­
est government’. This form of government is an 
arrangement (according to two recent analysts, 
Street and Skinner) “under which an attempt is 
made to make associative, self-interested collec­
tive action contribute to the achievement of 
public policy objectives”. But in effect, such 
government by private interest embraces a range 
of intermediate organisations, from those regu­
lating advertising standards to those regulating 
the dairy industry. Such entities act to translate 
between considerations of public policy and pres­
sures for private profit. Formed by central govern­
ment itself, though independent of its direct 
control, they nonetheless act to link the calcula­
tions and actions of very different organisations 
and businesses into a governmental network, 
falling outside the philosophical divisions of state 
and market.
At the rhetorical and programmatic level, 
neoliberalism also embodies a profound transfor­
mation in the mechanisms for governing social 
life. In place of collective provision and social 
solidarity the new rationality of government pro­
poses notions of security provided through the 
private purchase of insurance schemes, health 
care purchased by individuals and provided by 
the health industry and efficiency secured through 
the discipline of competition within the market. 
The public provision of welfare and social secu­
rity no longer appears as a vital part of a program 
for political stability and social efficiency.
Central to such a transformation has been a 
series of programs and strategies that have sought 
to penetrate the professional, political and bu­
reaucratic bastions of welfare. Neoliberal pro­
grams to reform welfare draw support from their 
echo of a range of other challenges to the mecha­
nisms of the welfare state.
Many radicals and socialists have argued that 
welfare has more to do with legitimating power 
and controlling socially troublesome elements
'Many radicals 
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than with equity or justice. Sociologists have 
portrayed the helping professions as moral entre­
preneurs manipulating moral panics to their own 
ends. Feminists have interpreted welfare as im­
bued with a familial and patriarchal ideology. 
Civil libertarians have criticised the discretion­
ary power of welfare professionals and bureau­
crats, seeing in it a violation of legal standards 
and rights. Experts have argued that welfare does 
more harm than good, creating dependence, 
stigmatisation and destroying the ties of family 
and relationship that were the true guarantors of 
social and mental health. And the newly consti­
tuted welfare consumers began to assert their own 
demands.
Monetarism has played a key role in breach­
ing the ramparts of the welfare state. Forexample, 
when contemporary British hospitals are required 
to translate their therapeutic activities—from 
operating theatres to laundry rooms— into cash 
equivalents, a new form of visibility is conferred 
upon them, new relations established and new 
procedures of decision-making made possible. 
Making people write things down and what things 
people are made to write down is itself a kind of 
government of them, an encouragement to think 
about and note certain aspects of their activities 
according to certain standards. The figures them­
selves transform the activity: they enable new 
standards to be constructed and new comparisons 
and evaluations made.
The monetarisation of health through the 
mechanism of budgets and through the various 
devices of health economists effects a fundamen­
tal transformation in the power relations of the 
health apparatus. It is not an attempt to impose a 
power where previously none existed, but rather 
to transform the terms of calculation from medi­
cal to financial, and hence to shift the fulcrum of 
the health network from the consultants to the 
managers. And far from autonomising the health 
apparatus, power is relayed back from the operat­
ing theatre to the cabinet office, for the resources 
in which managers calculate are those controlled 
largely at the centre: money.
The rejigging of the apparatus of welfare put 
in place in the period since the end of the war 
entails the attempt to ‘privatise’ certain activities 
that were previously provided within the institu­
tional apparatus of the state: in Britain the trans­
fer of housing from local authorities to private 
landlords and housing associations, the attempt 
to redirect provision of hostels and the like to the 
‘voluntary’ sector. No doubt much could be said 
about these programs and their objectives. Here 
only one point can be made.
Within the institutions of the state, welfare 
bureaucracies were a swarm of small fiefdoms 
riven with inter-professional rivalries, each try­
ing to turn policy objectives, programs and re­
sources to their own ends, to increase their re­
sources, their staff, their status and power at the 
expense of others. The devices of the welfare 
state bear witness to the continual failure of 
policy makers to enrol social actors into a stable 
network that would allow ‘action at a distance’ 
from the centres of deliberation and calculation 
into depths of the social body. Relocating aspects 
of welfare in the ‘private’ or ‘voluntary’ sector 
does not necessarily render them less governable, 
although clearly different procedures and alli­
ances are involved in constructing networks out­
side the institutions of the state. However, the 
opposition between state and non-state is inad­
equate to characterise them.
Neoliberalism also entails a reorganisation of 
programs for governing personal life. The lan­
guage of the entrepreneurial individual, endowed 
with freedom and autonomy, has come to pre­
dominate over almost any other in ethical evalu­
ations and the evaluation of programs of govern­
ment. Neoliberalism’s aim is to create a sphere of 
freedom where autonomous agents make their 
decisions, pursue their preferences and seek to 
maximise their own quality of life. The political 
subject is now less a social citizen with powers and 
obligations deriving from membership of a col­
lective body, than an individual whose citizen­
ship is active. An individual’s citizenship is mani­
fested not in the receipt of public largesse, but in 
the energetic pursuit of personal fulfilment. The 
vocabulary of enterprise translates between the 
ethics of government, programs for economic 
health and the values that are to structure the 
lives of individuals. Individuals are to strive to 
fulfil themselves, families are to calculate and 
plan to maximise their own qualities of life, and 
citizens are not to rely on the state to provide 
assistance to the needy but are to engage them­
selves directly in philanthropic projects which 
will assist others at the same time as they improve 
the self.
This account of neoliberalism is detailed 
enough to dissuade simplistic comparisons be­
tween Britain and Australia. There are points of 
similarity and some points of difference between 
the roles and states of development of 
neoliberalism in the two nations. Moreover, as 
Australia is a federation, a proper understanding 
of neoliberalism in this country must be an under­
standing of its ‘progress’ in each state as well as at 
the federal level. Whatever Jeff Kennett says or 
does, we urge readers to keep in mind that 
neoliberalism is a reorganisation more than it is a 
revolution. ■
NIKOLAS ROSE is professor of sociology at 
Goldsmith’s College, University of London. 
GARY W ICKHAM teaches in sociology at 
Murdoch University, WA.
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STRICTLY ETHNIC
W hy have film  theorists shunned funny movies? Is it simply that theorists are un­
willing toexacerbate their killjoy repu­
tations by making a move on cin­
ematic humour? Even more puzzling, 
given the way jokes have been used to 
beat women around the head, is the 
fact that the large and influential con­
tingent of feminists writing on film 
have said so little on the perennially 
popular genre of comedy. Ratherthan 
wheeling out the old line about femi­
nists’ lack of humour, I’d like to sug­
gest that the tools of trade of film 
theorists are, in the fashion of a Laurel 
and Hardy sketch, quite destructively 
getting in the way of an investigation 
into the comic in films.
During the mid-70s, feminist ac­
counts of film made a huge leap for­
ward when attention shifted from 
stereotypes of women to the way in 
which the act of watching film is 
gendered. The key to this new ap­
proach was a picture of the processes 
of viewing, based on a metaphor be­
tween the darkened cinema and the 
scene of the child’s incorporation into 
society and language as described in 
rereadings of Freud. This metaphor 
has proved immensely productive. 
Unfortunately, the tendency to see 
even a symbolic family hearth as the 
uncomplicated domain of pink and 
blue playsuits has beset many feminist 
writers on film who have produced a 
diverse and fascinating range of film 
analyses in which influence of ethnic­
ity (or indeed class, racism and so on) 
is either entirely ignored, or made to 
parallel neatly the workings of gen­
der.
Perhaps the neglect, of comedy, 
then, can be attributed to its manifest 
dependence on the play between par­
ticular notions of class, race, religios­
ity and a multitude of other social 
distinctions. In Jokes and their Rela­
tionship to the Unconscious, Freud sug­
gests that jokes are a symptom of un­
derlying psychic processes. T aking the 
substance of humour seriously, how­
ever, is one interesting way of discov­
ering how popular culture links gen­
der with otber kinds of social identity. 
And what better example could 
present itself than Baz Luhrmann’s 
Stricdy Ballroom ?
One of the central scenes in Strictly 
Ballroom gives a strong indication that 
understanding comedy can involve 
relating ideas about gender to those 
around ethnicity. Fran’s grandmother, 
teaching Scott to dance “from the 
heart”, comments admiringly to her 
rather embarrassed grandchild about 
the nice body exposed by his unbut­
toned shirt. The older woman’s re­
mark is in Spanish, conveniently sub­
titled for English-speaking members 
of the audience. It’s a funny moment, 
playing on assumptions about wom­
en’s (and especially older women’s) 
supposed disinclination to look at male
Why don't feminists 
talk about comedy? 
NICOLE MATTHEWS 
thinks Strictly 
Ballroom might help 
to explain.
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bodies. The joke signals a reversal of 
the romance plot, suddenly giving Fran 
inside knowledge and the upper hand 
in a relationship with Scott which 
had until then been characterised by 
his mastery and her ignorance.
The recourse to subtitled Spanish 
also pulls the audience into line with 
the two women’s look at a male body, 
making explicit the undercurrent of 
display present in the flamboyant 
dance sequences throughout the 
movie. Feminist accounts have 
pointed out that in classical cinema 
it’s overwhelmingly male characters 
who serve as the proxy for the specta­
tor, more often than not directing the 
gaze of both camera and audience at 
the image of a female body. Even 
within Strictly Ballroom, the removal 
of Fran’s glasses is a time-honoured 
metaphor for her transformation from 
observing ugly duckling to an attrac­
tive dancer at the centre of attention. 
Given the importance of this conven­
tion, it is of considerable interest that 
it’s the timely intervention of 
Spanishness which triggers the audi­
ence’s identification witha/erruile gaze 
at a male body. Understanding the 
effects of ethnicity might be crucial, 
at least in this film, to an understand­
ing of gender and comedy.
Spanishness isn’t of course the only 
ethnicity which features in Strict!} Ball­
room. Rather, it’s a particular variant 
of Australian identity which gives the 
movie its distinctive quality—a spe­
cifically feminised kind of kitsch. The 
film traces the struggle of the talented 
Scott for an individual kind of danc­
ing outside the restrictive regulations 
of the Dance Federation. While this is 
a familiar romantic novel plot-line, 
it’s the over-the-top character of the 
status quo from which the epic strug­
gle for innovation in dance-sport takes 
place that is one of the most notable 
features of the film. The stylisation of 
the costumes, dance steps and even 
personality (Scott’s mother exclaims 
“I’ve got my happy face on”) evoke a 
kind of rampant conformism which is 
personified primarily by the women in 
Scott’s life.
The portrayal of Scott’s ambitious 
and conventional mother and his ec­
centric and brilliant father elicits 
groans of recognition from those
schooled in film clichg. It’s worth 
noting also that Scott and his initial 
dancing partner Liz fit the same mould 
of female convention and male inno­
vation. In fact, the identification of 
women with unquestioning conform­
ity is a hoary connection, going back 
at least to responses to modernity in 
the early part of this century. Critics 
of the move to mass culture viewed 
the mass audience not only as 
undifferentiated and easily led, but 
particularly feminised.
Fashion is often depicted as the 
realm of an irrational female 
conformism. The preposterous cos­
tumes which characterise the ball­
room dancers in Strictly Ballroom pow­
erfully and comically evoke this con­
nection. It’s significant that although 
a few hints through the film indicate 
acontemporary setting, the costumes, 
sets and sound-track give the film a 
‘retro’ feel. Following the maxim that 
there’s nothing so ridiculous as last 
decade’s fashions, this dated quality 
makes it all the easier to laugh at the 
milieu of compulsory ballroom.
Strictly Ballroom’s depiction of the 
conformism of the dance studio also 
has overtones of the version of Aus­
tralian suburbia drawn upon in the 
persona of Edna Everage. It’s an 
Australianness of the cultural cringe; 
a feminised alternative to the bush
battler image. The hit song of the 
film, John Paul Young’s disco tune 
“Love is in the Air,” captures this 
version of Australianness perfectly. A 
kitsch classic of a period that came in 
for a great deal of ridicule in the 80s, 
the song wallows in romance, The use 
of J PY’s song in the film is perhaps best 
described as reaffirmative parody, 
since the final sequence isn’t just a 
take-off of the song on the sound­
track, but borrows its romantic con­
notations as well. Nonetheless, the 
song neatly encapsulates the central 
joke in the film—ajokeonafeminised, 
and particularly Australian, kind of 
conformism.
Of course, there is at least one 
woman in Strictly Ballroom who es­
capes the taint of conformity—and 
that is Fran, Scott’s dancing partner. 
The ‘authentic’ culture of her family 
lends her dancing, as well as her per­
son, distinction. Scott’s first recogni­
tion of Fran’s choreographic ability, 
for instance, is prompted by a snappy 
Spanish-flavoured step. The laughter 
that greets Scott’s attempts at the 
ballroom version of the paso doble in 
the presence of Fran’s family provides 
an internal reference point for jokes 
on the stylised qualities of ballroom 
dancing.
Two kinds of women—Scott’s 
mother and partner on the one hand, 
and Fran on the other— embody 
Scott’s two alternatives of the roman­
tic novel plot. Along with romance 
and drama, the tension between these 
two versions of femininity provides 
most of the humour of the film. How­
ever, without recognising the weight 
of‘authentic’ ethnicity in the plot, or 
the significance of an Australianised 
conformism in the depiction of the 
women in the film, one would be 
hard-pressed to see how Strictly Ball­
room works as a comedy. Attending to 
these elements within film doesn’t 
mean losing sight of cultural influ­
ence of gender. Rather, it means grasp­
ing the nuances of gender itself. And, 
hopefully, in the process, gaining some 
insight into the gendering of com­
edy. a
NICOLE MATTHEWS is a re­
search student in Humanities at 
Griffith University.
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THE RISE OF 
THE NOAM
P eter W intonick and Mark Achbar’s Manufacturing Con­sent: Noam Chomsky and the 
Media has been very well received, 
not just by its ‘natural constituency' of 
leftish political and media activists, 
but by a wider audience both at the 
cinemas and through its screening on 
SBS-TV. Considering that the film is 
about one prominent academic and 
his views on the world, and consists 
largely of a series of interviews with, 
or monologues by, Chomsky, its suc­
cess might seem, on the face of it, 
surprising.
The book by Noam Chomsky and 
Edward Herman upon which the film 
is based represents the most sophisti­
cated and empirically grounded pres­
entation yet of a ‘propaganda model’ 
of the operation of the mass media in 
contemporary democratic societies. 
For the authors, the mass media in the 
United States functions as a means of 
exercising 'thought control’ over its 
intelligentsia and citizenry, in the in­
terests of the dominant political and 
economic elites. Like other analyses 
of this type, it sees the concentration 
of ownership of mass media in the 
hands of a small number of large, 
profit-driven corporations, and their 
dependence upon corporate advertis­
ing revenues for commercial survival, 
as being at the base of explaining their 
operations and their effects.
Ownership and advertising de­
pendence are two of the ‘filters’ which, 
Chomsky argues, skew the process of 
news-gathering and selection in some 
directions and not in others. Others 
include the dependence established 
by journalists upon a few information 
sources, of which government, busi­
ness and ‘experts’ funded by either or 
both of these sources are the most 
important; the use of ‘flak’ by think- 
tanks and syndicated columnists as a 
means of ‘disciplining’ the media and 
controlling potential renegades; and 
the use of ‘anti-communism’ as an 
ideological control mechanism.
An interesting aspect of the film 
Manufacturing Consent is the way it 
relates Chomsky’s analysis of the me­
dia and his broader political economy 
of American powertohisearlierwork 
in structural linguistics. For Chomsky 
there is a human nature which is fun­
damentally rational and enquiring, or 
what isnow called a ‘rational Cartesian 
subject’ (after 17th Century French 
philosopher Ren6 Descartes who 
sought to establish a mathematical 
theory of mind). The violence of con­
temporary democratic societies is the 
way in which they prevent real hu­
man needs, such as the needs for crea­
tive work and free enquiry, from being 
realised.
The significance and shortcom­
ings of this conception of knowledge, 
power and human nature is intimated 
at in Manufacturing Consent by a brief 
excerpt from a Dutch television pro­
gram from 1971, where Chomsky fea­
tured in an interview with French 
political philosopher Michel Foucault. 
For Foucault, the interesting political 
and intellectual question is not 
whether or not there is a ‘human na-
Manufacturing 
Consent, a film about 
American cultural 
critic Noam Chomsky, 
was a raging success 
on the art-film 
circuit. But TERRY 
FLEW (left) and DAVID
Mcknight (overleaf) 
are uneasy with 
Chomsky's
conspiratorial vision.
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ture’, but lies in considering the effects 
in Western societies of seeking to an­
swer that question, and to that shape 
institutions around the sorts of an­
swers reached. The consequence in 
Foucault’s research was that they 
turned from the question of the ‘why’ 
to the ‘how’ of power, and from ab­
stract discussions of human nature to 
more specific understandings of the 
formation of social subjects.
This has a bearing on some of the 
limitations of Manufacturing Consent. 
A t one point Chomsky is asked by a 
Canadian student newspaper editor to 
expand upon how the power systems 
he has outlined actually work. The 
student gets a fairly blunt answer to 
the effect that as soon as you challenge 
corporate power in media work, you 
will be crushed by those dominant 
elites, whether you work for a major 
media institutionorfora student news­
paper—unless you are simply being 
ignored. To me thisdid not answer the 
question. There is a sense in which the 
New York Times editor featured in the 
film is correct to say time pressures 
and forms of routinisation in journal­
istic practice are a more powerful force 
in ‘framing’ particular issues in a cer­
tain way than the direct intervention 
of proprietors, their agents or powerful 
vested interests. Wbat needs to be 
added to his picture, however, is a 
consideration of the ways in which 
ideas of ‘journalistic professionalism’ 
interact with both such routines and 
power constraints, as well as with the 
sorts of power systems outlined by 
Chomsky, to what comes to us as news.
It is also notable that both the film 
and Chomsky’s overall analysis are 
very America-centric, and particularly 
centred around the gap between the 
ideals and the practice of US foreign 
policy. It is not clear how applicable 
such an analysis is to countries such as 
Australia, where domestic politics are 
not so much driven by foreign policy 
issues. Another problem relates to 
Chomsky’s idea of‘manipulation’: it is 
clear from the film that the mass me­
dia manipulates and distorts the truth, 
but is a truly truthful presentation of 
news, which presents all facts and opin­
ions, possible given constraints of time 
and format? More significantly, if the 
news media is manipulative, then so is
the film. This is not a criticism of the 
film as such—all films of this type seek 
to generate a sympathetic portrayal of 
their subject—but it does point to an 
important political point.
Part of the reason why certain 
viewpoints have predominated in the 
news media in recent years is that 
their advocates have employed quite 
targeted media strategies, relating an 
assessment of new routines to the de­
ployment of resources to particular 
ends. This has mostly been the pre­
rogative of ‘think-tanks’ and corpo­
rate-funded bodies, but such strate­
gies have also been employed by groups 
such as Greenpeace to good effect. In 
Australia it has often been argued in 
the 1980s (quite contrary to the situ­
ation in the mid-70s) that the Labor 
Party gets an unreasonably positive 
presentation from the media. This is 
usually explained by an argument that 
journalists arepro-Labor, but I believe 
the answer lies more in a better media
strategy, combined with other forms 
of social and ideological mobilisation, 
than the Coalition has thus far been 
able to develop. The period leading 
up to the next federal election will 
certainly provide an interesting ‘case 
study’ of such a question.
The sort of ‘balance’ the news 
media realises on any issue at any 
particular time will always reflect in 
part the distribution of power resources 
in the overall society. But the rela­
tionship is not as straightforward as 
Chomsky and other advocates of the 
‘propaganda model’ suggest. For those 
with different political agendas, the 
lesson of Manufacturing Consent may 
be to learn how to better ‘manage’ the 
media, as well as posing more abstract 
questions about bias and truth. ■
TERRY FLEW teaches in the School 
of Humanities at the University of 
Technology, Sydney.
MANUFACTURING
CONSPIRACY
O
ne simply has to say the words 
‘the media’ in some circles to 
immediately identify the force 
responsible for a multitude of social 
evils. It’s just like saying ‘Hinch’ or 
‘Sixty Minutes’ or ‘John Laws’ or 
‘bloody Gerard Henderson’ (orforA?^ 
readers ‘Michael Barnard’). Thus, 
Chomsky’s views on the media in 
Manufacturing Consent ‘strike a chord ’ 
with many people on the Left, appeal­
ing because of their similar muddled 
mixture of valid criticism, ignorance 
and poorly thought out assumptions.
At one point in Manufacturing 
Consent Chomsky contends that the 
media’s preoccupation with sport is a 
diversion to keep people amused and 
entertained while the real policy mak­
ers get on with the job in secret and 
away from the eyes of the populace. 
It’s not his main point but it’s a good 
place to start.
I never watch sport on TV. Or­
ganised team sport has never appealed 
to me and watching it bores me; I 
don’t understand why some of my 
friends waste hours watching it. But as 
far as I know the fact that they watch 
it does nothing to blunt their critical 
faculties or to ‘manufacture consent’ 
within their skulls. If people watch 
lots of sport, game shows and sitcoms 
on TV and little else, the chances are 
they wi 1 be poorly informed about 
national politics and social issues. 
They will probably have views on 
these things, but they will not be 
informed by much actual informa-
ti0n . ^ T Y (thouSh certainly not 
‘will )kad them to have conservative 
views, u aret eirconservativeviews
C° u5!  , ? d by ̂ eirTV watch­
ing hab'ts. And is it reall ible
t̂ TLT 'CUft,VeSfloodthe network
^dsitcomstoke^them11160- T i
off the actions of power-
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It’s obviously not as simple as that. 
The social values which underl ie many 
sitcoms and current affairs programs 
exist ‘out there’ in the real world as 
much as ‘inside’ the production teams 
that produce them. In my experience, 
while journalists and media people 
too often resort to the argument that 
‘we give them what they want’, there 
is a sense in which they are right. And 
there is definitely a sense in which TV 
ratings and circulation mean some­
thing.
This is the real problem with 
Chomsky’s railing against sport: it’s a 
kind of criticism which lets journalists 
and media people off the hook too 
easily. It’s easy for journalists to an­
swer (or usually ignore) such silly criti­
cism and carry on as if all critics are 
similarly intellectual snobs or totally 
off-beam.
The really telling criticism of con­
temporary media behaviour is not the 
fact that people like to be entertained, 
but that, increasingly, TV news and 
current affairs and press coverage is 
being presented simply as entertain­
ment. Shuffled aside in this process is 
a body of practices and beliefs about 
the ideals of journalism that get in the 
way of such ‘infotainment’. A  recent
edition of Channel Nine News cov­
ered three car accidents in the space 
of its 18 minutes or so of non-sport 
news. If you asked the news editor or 
the journalists at Nine why this was 
so, in all likelihood they would say it 
was a slow news day. Or maybe they 
would respond “that’s what our view­
ers want to know" —and point to 
their smashing ratings success as the 
final answer.
But, quite independent of ratings, 
journalism must have its own stand­
ards. ] oumalism must have some con­
cept of professionalism and of public 
service. One of the most serious criti­
cisms of‘the media’ is that too often it 
doesn’t live up to its self-proclaimed 
goals of informing people. But often it 
is as much to do with laziness, coward­
ice and place-seeking as it is by the 
conservative values of media people, 
juniorand senior, let alone Chomsky’s 
grand conspiracy.
Manufacturing Consent has a dra­
matic sequence which compares the 
tiny coverage in the New York Times 
given to East Timor between 1975 
and 1979 compared to that provided 
for Cambodia in the same period. In 
both countries genocide was taking 
place. In Timor it was by the USA’s 
ally Indonesia while, in Cambodia, it
was by America’s enemies. O f course, 
it is not surprising that a US newspa­
per covers Cambodia more than 
Timor, given the more overt and long- 
lasting US entanglement with 
Indochina. Yet even this rings untrue 
in Australia where the media covered 
East Timor extensively and where, in 
some cases, dramatic news stories and 
pictures of Indonesian atrocities have 
galvanised public opinion.
In fact, that strong media cover­
age and exposure of the horror of 
Indonesian aggression didn’t change 
Australia’s policy on East Timor much. 
And that’s significant. The power to 
change policy lies in the hands of the 
bureaucracy and the elite in political 
parties who are often only indirectly 
affected by public opinion or ‘the 
media’. Chomsky’s right that power­
ful corporate and political elites prefer 
to operate in secrecy. And there is far 
too little commitment by TV, radio 
and press to investigative work to rem­
edy that situation. But that has more 
to do with laziness and tight-fisted 
budgets than it does with a desire by 
editors or owners to protect the pow­
erful. ■
DAVID McKNIGHT is a researcher 
at ABC TV’s Four Corners.
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JUST DESERTS?
Boris Frankel: he's not the Messiah, just a 
very naughty hoy, reports PAUL PATTON.
From the Prophets Deserts Come: 
The Struggle to Reshape Australian 
Political Culture, by Boris Frankel 
(Boris Frankel and Arena Publishing, 
1992).
F
rankePs book is intended as a 
scathing critique of the 'proph­
ets’ of contemporary Australian 
political culture. According to 
Frankel, the New Right, Accordists, 
Left Technocrats, Feminists, Environ­
mentalists, Aboriginal activists and 
enthusiasts of popular culture all, 
whether by design or ruse of history, 
conspire to produce an intellectual, 
cultural and political desert. This is 
not the 'desert’ beloved of the 
Nietzschean philosopher, “where the 
strong independent spirits withdraw 
and become lonely”, much less the 
‘desert’ produced and inhabited by 
Deleuzian nomads, but rather the 
Wasteland of a public sphere swept 
clean of alternative policies by the 
twin scourges of economic rational­
ism and cultural postmodernism. On 
both sides of politics, Frankel informs 
us, we are faced with only more or less 
rigorous versions of the same impera­
tive to encourage a productivist cul­
ture and to transform thiscountry into 
an economically viable competitor in 
the emerging global market economy.
On the ruins of the oppositional 
Left, he complains, we find only 
postmodern cynicism, mindless rela­
tivism and a general retreat from the 
heroic ambitions of the revolutionar­
ies of yesteryear. What Australian po­
litical culture lacks, according to 
Frankel, is a comprehensive vision of 
an alternative ecologically sustainable 
and anti-capitalist society: not just 
the founding principles, but the de­
tailed economic and political propos­
als which would show how a society 
“based on such things as a reduced 
working week, the redistribution of
ARTWORK: JOCK ALEXANDER
wealth, as well as the reorganisation 
of paid and unpaid labour in the do­
mestic and public spheres” might be 
implemented and maintained.
Clearly, Frankel himself is a 
prophet of sorts, crying out in the 
wilderness for a return to the old ways 
of Left critique and analysis: utopian 
vision and unambiguous moral and 
aesthetic values, all grounded upon 
the bedrock of institutional and po­
litical-economic analysis. This book 
we are told, is but the first of a two or 
three volume series which will even­
tually present not only an analysis of 
economic policy and organisational 
changes in the Australian polity, but 
also detailed alternative policies and 
institutional arrangements.
As an historical materialist aware 
of the far-reaching changes in the 
capitalist modes of production, ex­
change, consumption and communi­
cation during the latter part of the 
20th century, and sensitive to the 
manner in which these have con­
strained the rationalising agendas of 
Australian governments during the 
70s and 80s and 90s, Frankel is not 
optimistic about the prospects for a 
radical alternative: “It must be said 
that the choice confront­
ing Australians at the moment is 
bleak indeed. Essentially, we have a 
large current account trade deficit and 
a giant surplus of old ideas and old 
organisations.”
Undeterred by the historical fail­
ure of Old and New Left programs for 
large-scale social change, he suggests 
that the fault lies entirely with the 
Left itself: “What undermined the Left, 
in countries such as Australia, was its 
inability to convince its own mem­
bers, let alone many citizens, that it 
had the theoretical solutions and prac­
tical organisational capacity to deal 
with major socio-economic problems. 
It was overrun by default.” Supposing 
that he could overcome this default in 
the changed circumstances of the 90s 
and provide us with ideals that would 
galvanise a population to concerted 
and coherent action, as well as show 
us how to redistribute wealth, main­
tain living standards and convert to 
an ecologically sustainable economy, 
without penalty at the hands of inter­
national commodity and capital mar­
kets, Frankel would be more than just 
a prophet. He would be the messiah.
Readers could be forgiven for won­
dering why this undead Author does 
not simply get on with the positive 
task instead of devoting 374 pages to 
denouncing the insufficiencies of oth­
ers, many of whom would not recog­
nise themselves as his competitors in 
such a project. It is, after all, a distinc­
tive feature of the book that every­
body gets a serve: the Old and the 
New Left, the ALP, the ACTU and 
assorted other Left Technocrats; the 
Old and New Right; Postmodernists 
and the liberal intelligentsia.
Frankel’s ideal of a comprehen­
sive and economically grounded criti­
cal alternative ensures that everyone 
else falls short. Either they have taken 
the path of economic realism 
(Accordists and Left Technocrats, 
along with the economic rationalists 
of the New Right) and given up the 
prospect of anti-capitalist values, or 
they have embraced anti-capitalist
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values but given up on the attempt to 
implement these through social and 
institutional change (Environmental­
ists, Radical Feminists, Postmodernists 
and some Cultural pluralists).
The scope of Frankel’s radical cri­
tique is such as to ensure that he is 
never without a put-down. So, for 
example, a dominant theme of his 
critique of postmodern theories is the 
manner in which they have contrib­
uted to the reduction of politics to 
culture (read: abandoned political 
economy fortextual and cultural stud­
ies).
But then when he turns to discuss 
post-marxist cultural policy theorists 
who do take seriously the need for 
economically sustainable cultural 
practices, he finds fault with their 
abandonment of aesthetic principles. 
Never mind that it is only the idea of 
such principles that sustains his criti­
cism, the mere promise that old wine 
can be made to fill new bottles.
Frankel is not completely oblivi­
ous to political movements of the last 
30 years or so. However, \vhile he 
admits that marxism may not be ad­
equate to deal with ecological crises, 
gender relations and other aspects of 
sexuality and culture, this does not 
appear to imply more than superficial 
changes to his own position. Thus, 
while he is aware that the critiques of 
mass culture by members of the Frank­
furt School betray an unsustainable 
elitism, Frankel nevertheless longs for 
a similar position which would retain 
the critical connotation of the very 
concept ‘culture industry’. On this 
view, aesthetic excellence is simply 
incompatible with market relations, 
as are moral values or any acceptable 
forms of social or political life. How 
can beauty triumph in Australian or 
other capitalist cities, Frankel asks, 
“where design is constantly subordi­
nated to private developers and their 
real estate speculative investment 
strategies?” So much for 20th century 
architecture and design.
So what are the conditions under 
which beauty can triumph? Presum­
ably not the oppressive social hierar­
chies of pre-capitalist societies. 
Frankel’s attachment to such simplis­
tic oppositions as that between beauty 
and private development, or those
between capitalist social relations and 
relative equality between men and 
women, between market relations and 
ecologically sustainable economic 
growth, amounts to a massive strategy 
of deferral. Political culture is barren, 
it would seem, so long as it does not 
contribute to the attainment of the 
anti-capitalist, anti-patriarchal and 
ecologically sustainable utopia. At one 
point, Frankel approvingly cites Pierre 
Bourdieu’s description of the lifestyle 
of the rising petit bourgeoisie as one 
governed by “deferred pleasure”. Struc­
tural change may defeat the expecta­
tions of hard-working savers and lead 
to disenchantment and bitterness. 
Frenkel's diagnosis of the failure of the 
Left, the ‘sell-out’ by the Accordists 
and the ‘moral nihilism’ of 
Postmodernists is such a litany of re­
sentment that one cannot but suspect 
a similar structure of deferral underly­
ing his own aspirations.
Ironically, he speaks in tones that 
resemble those of the prophet whose 
teaching of weariness, failure and fu­
tility Nietzsche’s Zarathustra rejects. 
Not that we should expect someone 
as ill-disposed as Frankel is to any­
thing remotely resembling postmodern 
theory to count N ietzsche among those 
who might have something to con­
tribute to “the difficult task of con­
structing a* ‘postmodern politics”’. 
Others have leamt from Nietzsche, 
however, what many have experi­
enced within the day-to-day politics 
of some left, feminist and environ­
mental groups—namely that the struc­
tures of transcendence and deferral 
which have governed much ‘revolu­
tionary’ thinking sustain their own 
forms of oppression.
Indeed, remnants of stalinist logic 
occasionally surface in Frankel’s text. 
For example, afterallowing some value 
to poststructuralist reappraisal of as­
pects of the myth of Australian iden­
tity, he cautions the reader that “while 
it is a good thing that the political 
culture embodied in the ‘Australian 
legend’ is being subjected to radical 
critique, it must not be forgotten that 
the New Right also is committed to 
dismantling key aspects of the ‘Aus­
tralian character’”.
Thus is the ‘complicity’ of 
postmodernism and the New Right
established: not only does the former 
attack some of the same targets as the 
latter (never mind how different their 
critical strategies), but they ignore 
economics in favour of such second­
ary cultural matters as texts and bod­
ies, all the while abstaining from of­
fering alternative policies. The silence 
of Postmodernists when it comes to 
opposing economic rationalist poli­
cies is proof of complicity. Frankel 
subscribes to a magical kind of cul­
tural causation according to which 
Postmodernists simultaneously ignore 
economic analysis and ‘reduce’ politi­
cal economy to cultural analysis. Anti­
humanist analyses of cultural policy 
simultaneously pursue mindless cul­
tural relativism and ‘endorse’ the atti­
tudes of the New Right. The shadow 
logic of'objective counter-revolution- 
aries’ is not far behind.
Such a mode of criticism may be 
reason to doubt the moral credentials 
of Frankel’s utopia. Indeed, at times 
he does betray a certain fondness for 
the communitarian beliefs of the Old 
Right—even while pointing out the 
degree to which their commitment to 
the market logic of capitalism helps to 
undermine the conditions under 
which forms of community might be 
restored.
But even if one were sympathetic 
to the vague outlines of Frankel’s eco- 
socialist utopia, one could not help 
but wonder whether this might not be 
subject to a similar dilemma. On the 
one hand, a commitment to a realistic 
understanding of the economic and 
institutional conditions of social life; 
on the other, an aspiration to compre­
hensive rupture with those conditions. 
To know whether Frankel’s agenda 
was anything more than wishful think­
ing one would need not only a more 
detailed statement of that agenda but 
also a better understanding of the con­
straints upon economic and social 
change in the present. To the extent 
that this book produces neither, it is a 
paradigm of really useless polemic. ■
PAUL PATTON teaches in Gen­
eral Philosophy at Sydney Univer­
sity. He is the editor of Nietzsche, 
Feminism and Political Theory, to 
be published by Routledge in mid-
1993.
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Shadows of the Pomegranate Tree, 
by Tariq Ali. (Chatto and Windus, 
1992, $39.95), Reviewed by Jos£ 
Borghino.
S
hadows of the Pomegranate Tree 
is Tariq Ali’s second novel. His 
first, Redemption, (published in 
1990) was a cheeky satire about the 
politico-sexual machinations of the 
far Left; its pettifoggery, its inbred self- 
indulgence and its paranoid sectari­
anism.
The high water mark of A li’s no­
toriety came in the late 1960s. His 
work for Bertrand Russell’s Peace 
Foundation and Michael Heseltine’s 
Town magazine tookhim to the world’s 
hotspots—Vietnam, Cambodia, Jor­
dan, Bolivia, Berlin, Moscow— and 
brought him to the attention of the 
CIA. Back in Britain, he was targeted 
by the Special Branch, the Director of 
Public Prosecutions ordered an en­
quiry into his activities, and both Tory 
and Labour MPs clamoured for his 
deportation while John Lennon wrote 
Power to the People for him and his 
Associates.
Ali has written over a dozen books 
and plays on world history and poli­
tics, including Who’s AfraidofMargaret 
Thatcher?, Trotsky for Beginners, Can 
Pakistan Survive1, The Nehrus and the 
Gandhis and, in 1987, Streetfighting 
Years, a political autobiography of the 
decade between 1965 and 1975.
By any account, then, Ali has been 
a busy and productive man. He also 
has a gift for timing. Redemption, with 
its theme of the tragi-comic implo­
sion of the Old Left, appeared as the 
superannuated regimes of eastern Eu­
rope collectively suicided. Then, in
1992, the Year of 016, with anything 
Hispanic at the top of the hit parade 
for the marketers of History, Ali pub­
lished a ‘Spanish’ novel.
Set in 1500, when Francisco 
Ximenes de Cisneros became the arch­
bishop of Granada, Shadows of the 
Pomegranate Tree is more a family saga 
than a historical novel. It follows the 
declining fortunes of a Muslim family
as they face the dilemma posed by the 
rabid fanaticism of Cisneros who, un­
like his tolerant predecessor, gave Is­
lamic Granadinos the ‘choice’ of death 
or conversion to Catholicism.
Ali’s political purpose behind this 
novel is fairly obvious. At a time when 
Muslims can be blithely satanised by 
the West as barbaric, reactionary and 
repressive, Ali returns to a historical 
moment when the tables were turned. 
Islamic Granada was, in many senses, 
more sophisticated, liberal and toler­
ant than its Catholic neighbours. As 
the last bastion of Muslim rule in the 
Iberian peninsula, Ali also makes it an 
emblem for the 700 years of Islamic 
art, history and culture inSpain. When 
the Catholic monarchs marched in, 
and especially when they appointed 
Cisneros, this long tradition of social 
and religious tolerance was wiped out.
Ali opens the book with a scene 
guaranteed to make any late 20th 
century liberal wince. Cisneros orders 
the confiscation of all the manuscripts 
in the Moorish libraries of Granada 
and publicly puts them to the torch. 
The obvious echoes of Nazi 
bookbumings in the 1930s put the 
reader in no doubt that what follows 
will be a chronicle of religious perse­
cution, ethnocide and genocide with 
very modem overtones—but this time 
done in the name of Jesus Christ and 
so-called western values. The repeated 
ravings by Cisneros and others about 
the need for racial purity reinforce the 
links between the actions of the 16th 
Century Spanish Church and State 
and the practices of modem fascism.
The choice for the Muslim family 
at the centre of this saga is between 
religion and motherland. Most of the 
protagonists are justifiably confused— 
waiting for some sort of compromise, 
or a sign, or perhaps the aid of the 
Sultan of Turkey, none of which 
comes. Some of them convert to Chris­
tianity—with varying degrees of bad 
faith. One, the despised Great Uncle 
Meekal or Miguel, has become the 
Bishop of Cordova, although he ad­
mits in the course of the book that he
still faces Mecca and prays to Allah on 
Fridays. Others, like the firebrand eld­
est son of the clan, Zuhayr, take up 
arms against the infidel in a quixotic 
attempt to halt the destruction of their 
culture. Others flee to Morocco. But 
most are callously slaughtered in de­
fence of their small, idyllic town at the 
climax of the book.
I can tell you this without spoiling 
the end of the novel because a bloody 
massacre is clearly inevitable from the 
start— even if you don’t know a scrap 
of Spanish history. And this is one of 
the problems with the book: it deals 
with a dead-end culture—not the 
Moorish culture of post-conquest Gra­
nada in general but that of its ruling 
class. Ali has focused on the family 
that owns the small town of al-Huydal 
and its surrounding territory, and who, 
of course, have the most to lose from 
being dispossessed.
This helps him create some ethi­
cal tension because they would also 
have the most to gain from converting 
to Christianity. But, having set them 
up, as Ali does, as unquestionably 
honourable and honest folk, it is in­
conceivable that they should choose 
anything but an honourable and grisly 
end. Anything else would be like Luke 
Skywalker in StarWars betraying Prin­
cess Laya and setting up a McDonalds 
franchise with Darth Vaderon Pluto— 
no way Jos6!
True, the villagers of al-Hudayl, 
who include J ews and Christians, also 
choose to fight and die alongside their 
Muslim overlords, but by then they’ve 
been surrounded by cut-throat Chris­
tian soldiers anyway. It is also cer­
tainly true that Muslim Spain was 
considerably more tolerant of its sub- 
jugated Christian and Jewish 
populations than the Catholics turned 
out to be. My quibble is not with 
history but with this novelisation. It 
may serve A li’s purpose that the 
townsfolk are indiscriminately butch­
ered regardless of creed because it 
underlines the polemic he’s pushing 
about the blind fanaticism of 16th 
Century Spanish Catholics. As a nov- 
elistic device, however, it banishes 
any hope of the characters rising above 
the rhetoric and being any more than 
cardboard cutouts moved around to 
illustrate a thesis.
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In the end, even the heroic resist­
ance of the town against the blood­
thirsty Christians reads annoyingly like 
a boys’ own version of Islam's Last 
Stand. And, anyway, does anyone in 
the world, except perhaps the head of 
Opus Dei, believe that the Spanish 
Inquisition and the State that ran it, 
were anything but cruel, ignorant and 
corrupt? What little dramatic tension 
there is in Shadows of the Pomegranate
Starving in the Silences: An explora­
tion of anorexia nervosa by Matra 
Robertson (Allen & Unwin, 1992, 
$19.95).
Body Traps: How to overcome your 
body obsessions— and liberate the 
real you by Judith Rodin (Angus & 
Robertson, 1992, $16.95). Reviewed 
by Liz Eckermann.
T
he debate around the ‘natural­
ness’ or social constructedness of 
the body and the self preoccupies 
many social theorists writing about 
eating disorders. Matra Robertson and 
Judith Rodin represent the two sides 
of the debate. Both work as therapists 
treating people with problems around 
food and their bodies. Both use their 
encounters with clients to illustrate 
and elaborate on their theoretical 
stances. However, that is where the 
similarity ends.
Body Traps is a do-it-yourself 
manual for dealing with bodily obses­
sions. The audience is placed in a 
‘patient role’ as Rodin systematically 
outlines several ‘body traps’ including 
the vanity trap, the shame trap, the 
competition trap, food traps, dieting 
rituals traps, the fitness trap and the 
success trap. She identifies the origins 
of these various traps, offers quantita­
tive scales for the audience to self-test 
their degree of entrapment and sug­
gests escape routes.
The book is about bodies, yet it 
contains no theory of how bodies come
Tree appears not when Ali is dealing 
with the central members of this no­
ble family (who remain predictable 
throughout), but whenever Miguel or 
any other peripheral characters who 
have converted are on stage. A mar­
tyred end is the stuff of epic and propa­
ganda—day-to-day ambivalence, hu­
miliation, and contradiction are much 
better subjects for a novel.
To give him his due, Ali has resus-
to be seen in actuality. Neither the 
body nor the self are conceived of as 
socially constructed concepts. Rather, 
it is argued that the individual will 
only be free when she liberates the 
real (inner) self and develops a stable 
body image which is commensurate 
with her ‘real’ body. The title of the 
book itself implies that the body is a 
liability rather than enabling and that 
it takes massive amounts of‘selfwork’ 
and ‘bodywork’ to allow the body to 
reflect the ‘real’ person within.
The key problems which Rodin 
identities are"women’s lack of knowl­
edge about their bodies and their ‘mal­
leable’ body image. Her therapeutic 
prescription is to encourage women to 
correct false knowledge about them­
selves and their bodies and to embark 
on a crusade to ‘liberate the real you’. 
Rodin directs scathing criticism to­
wards tendencies within modem west­
ern societies towards surveillance and 
over-vigilance about the body, yet she 
entreats her audience to test, self- 
assess, monitor, check and scrutinise 
themselves to establish their degree of 
entrapment. The self is subjected to 
the scrutiny of the ‘normal’. In the 
genre of popular women’s magazines, 
Rodin supplies copious scales, tests 
and drawing exercises for self-diagno­
sis and then provides fix-it strategies 
for the reading audience to work on 
unleashing the self.
Although the key focus of Rodin’s 
book is work on the self, she does 
recognise the need for a more struc­
citated a small piece of history and 
given it some human dimension as 
well as connecting it to the present 
day. As an idea for a novel about the 
politics of race, Shadows of the Pome­
granate Tree is excellent. As a novel, 
however, it’s mediocre. ■
JOS6 BORGHINO is a freelance 
Spaniard.
tural approach to significant social 
change. She argues that ‘breaking the 
body traps’ involves ‘changing your­
self, changing other people, and 
changing society’. Her discussion of 
structural forces influencing and cir­
cumscribing women’s choices has 
strong parallels with Naomi Wolfs 
arguments in The Beauty Myth. Yet 
Rodin moves beyond Wolf in propos­
ing a conspiracy theory depicting so­
ciety as an ogre which conspires via 
socialisation and other forces to keep 
women entrapped.
The assumption of ignorance on 
the part of women about their bodies 
and their selves puts Rodin herself in 
something of a ‘knowledge trap’. She 
confuses cognitive and emotive as­
pects of body image— or, in other 
words, how women know and how 
they feel their body image. Research 
shows that more than 95% of women 
overestimate their body size. Rodin 
assumes this indicates inaccurate body 
knowledge. However, research con­
ducted in Adelaide by Ben-Tovim 
and others and reported in The Inter- 
maonalJournalofEatingDisorders sug­
gests there is a clear distinction be­
tween knowing that one is fat and 
‘feeling fat’. Overestimation on the- 
basis of ‘feeling fat’ does not necessar­
ily imply faulty knowledge.
Overall, Body Traps is 
undertheorised, overlong and uncriti­
cal about the effects of therapeutic 
intervention.
In a tight, concise and compre­
hensive yet occasionally playful book, 
Matra Robertson in Starving in the 
Silences uses therapeutic encounters 
to embellish a gripping narrative about 
women’s silenced history. She identi­
WORK THAT BODY
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fies competing discourses around the 
self-starver’s body using an eclectic 
theoretical approach, drawing on 
theory from phenomenology to 
postmodernism.
Robertson traces the process by 
which self-starvation moves from the 
religious realm in Mediaeval Europe 
to the medical clinic in the 19th cen­
tury and finally to the psychiatrist’s 
couch in the 20th century (after a 
brief foray into the endocrinologist’s 
laboratory in the early part of the 20th 
century). However, she moves be­
yond the familiar chronology to specu­
late about future trends in explana­
tory, diagnostic and therapeutic para­
digms. Robertson displays a refreshing 
intellectual self-awareness in much of 
the book, and is especially cautious 
about proposing feminist therapy as 
the final stage utopia of this historical 
process. She suggests that, in striving 
for a piece of the action, feminist 
therapy may become no more benign
than its precursors. It may represent 
just another discourse striving for as­
cendancy at the expense of consum­
ers of therapeutic services.
Where Rodin invites women to 
test their obsession against the ‘nor­
mal’ using quantitative scales (rein­
forced with writing and movement), 
Robertson envisages a far more fluid 
process of therapy. She encourages 
women to develop a new vocabulary 
(verbal and nonverbal) within which 
to ‘write, speak and be heard’. Laugh­
ter, pleasure, playfulness, games and 
music are seen as important thera­
peutic activities, alongside art, jour- 
nal-keeping, visualisation and 
memory work. She emphasises the 
lost choices and options that women 
relinquish in assuming such labels as 
‘anorexic’, and in the same vein as 
‘narrative’ writers such as Michael 
White (Literate Means to Therapeutic 
Ends) encourages women to ‘articu­
late other parts of the self outside of
so-called typical anorexic patterns’. 
In other words, the self is not ‘given’: 
it can be constructed and multiply- 
constituted.
Robertson points to the central 
role of language in the constitution of 
the self: “It is through the acquisition 
of language that the individual devel­
ops a sense of self and enters the patri­
archal symbolic order.” She empha­
sises the need to step back from the 
‘anorexic body’ and self as a psychiat­
ric category and create a voice outside 
the patriarchal symbolic order. This 
contrasts with Rodin’s tendency to 
cast her audience as ‘potential pa­
tients’ to be scrutinised from the view­
point of the ‘normal’ and in need of 
cues (or as she states it— ’’informa­
tion”) on how to enter the ‘normal’ 
order. ■
LIZ ECKERMANN teaches in the 
Sociology of Health at Deakin Uni­
versity, Geelong.
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Why the Left should 
pause for thought 
about Victoria; that 
damned new design.
•#
Bully for 
Boofhead
Jeff Kennett must be 
given credit for being the 
most honest politician in the 
land. He promised Boofhead 
and he delivered Boofhead. 
The pay rise for the minister 
in charge of lowering every­
body else’s pay is just about 
the level of decision-making 
that the voters had been led 
to expect. So, too, more or 
less, is the new silver service 
for the Parliament House din­
ing room.
Complaints about the 
new government’s broken 
promises are risible. By the 
prevailing standards of po­
litical rhetoric his lies were 
trivial, indeed ritual. In any 
case, by dishonestly conceal­
ing its debts on such a mas­
sive scale, the former Labor 
government has given him 
an excellent excuse to break 
any promise he likes. Com­
parisons of Kennett with Hit­
ler are particularly fatuous, 
and quite insulting to the vie- 
tims of the real Hitler. 
Kennett was elected by a clear 
majority in a fair election.
The Labor government 
was thrown out because it 
ran up enormous debts and 
did a great deal of damage to 
the state’s economy. The sta­
tistics are sufficiently well 
known to need nodetail here. 
Yet the most prominent op­
ponent of the new regime, 
John Halfpenny, talks as 
though state budgetary prob­
lems simply do not exist and 
mindlessly pushes for ongo­
ing industrial action which 
can only damage the state 
further.
It is time for the Left to 
stop moaning and groaning, 
to admit frankly that we made 
a mess of things, and do some 
solid thinking about what 
went wrong. What do we 
want to achieve in govern­
ment, and how will we go
about achieving it ?The Labor 
Party can hardly offer itself to 
the public in future as the 
party of increasing debt and 
economic decline. Without 
serious thought and careful 
analysis the Left will simply 
become marginalised in the 
political process and, indeed, 
that is what it will deserve.
Among the issues to be 
resolved will be the follow­
ing:
* How does a party with a 
strong power base in public 
sector unions deal with the 
need for structural change and 
efficiency in the public sec­
tor? A lot of progress has been 
achieved in this area else­
where. In NSW the railways 
have been modernised gradu­
ally without forced redundan­
cies. Sadly, the V ictorian situ­
ation is now too serious for 
this to be possible.
* How can education, 
with a limited budget, im­
prove the chances of children 
from disadvantaged back­
grounds? There is a common 
perception that Victoria has 
spent heavily but it may even 
have had the opposite effect.
* How can health serv­
ices be made more efficient 
without loss of equity?
* How can environmen­
talism be reconciled with so­
cial equity? Victoria under 
Labor had the most zealous 
Environmental Protection 
Agency in Australia, and the 
lowest level of investment. If 
we are to advocate zero growth 
we should do so frankly and
examine the implications for 
social equity. The losers oth­
erwise are likely to be those at 
the bottom of the social peck1 
ing order, certainly not those 
at the top.
An economic crisis of the 
proportions which we are now 
experiencing will entail great 
social change. It entails both 
opportunities and threats to 
improvement in social equity. 
The fatuous post-Kennett 
election debate ignores the 
critical issue of the times. ■
RODNEY HENDERSON, 
Annandale, NSW.
Not Your Type
Why have you done this 
to me, a reader of ALR from 
the first issue?
ALR’s November issue 
had a crunched up typeface 
which made reading hard 
work instead of a pleasure. 
Why the change from the 
previous typeface which was 
reader-friendly? If the new 
typeface heralds the new style 
of ALR that has been forecast
I dread what other changes 
are contemplated. ■
JACK HUTSON, 
Canterbury, Vic.
We happen to like the new 
typeface but astute readers will 
notice that it has been increased 
in size since the November is­
sue, to be easier on the eye.—
Ed.
COMING UP IN ALR
A Special Issue:
ALR's Agenda For The Fifth Term, 
plus women and cities, republican­
ism, AIDS policy and much more. In 
your local newsagent by March 4. 
Don't miss it.
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MUFFED
I'm a magazine 
Junkie. I love the 
things. Sometimes I 
walk into a 
newsagent on the 
way to the weekly 
grocery shopping 
and end up blowing 
the whole budget 
on a stack of mags.
Idon’tdiscriminateeither. I'll read about anything. It’s 
just as easy to shell out too 
much money for a wanky 
British style glossy as it is to 
pick up the latest issue of 
Simpsons Illustrated (espe­
cially when they throw in 
nifty gifts like a free pair of 3- 
D glasses!).
But as any fellow member 
of Mags Anonymous will tell 
you, the time of year when 
you can really go into a feed­
ing frenzy is the annual round­
up. The 20 best records of 
1992; the 50 best dressed peo­
ple of 1992; the 100 most 
nicely groomed poodles of 
1992— it all adds up to fasci­
nating reading. The main rea­
son for the fascination is that 
when you discuss these arti­
cles with fellow mag junkies 
at parties, you can scoff at the 
choice of music/the- drastic 
dress sense/the poorly coiffed 
pooches. In reality you’re 
thinking “Shit, I’ve never 
even heard of half the bands 
in this list!”
There was only one prob­
lem with the reams of infor­
mat ion that flooded the racks 
as 1993 lumbered into view. 
Where was the list of the most 
ingenious people of the year? 
I’mnot talking aboutground- 
breaking physicists or fear­
less environmentalists or 
genre-busting novelists here. 
I’m talking about people like 
that guy up in Queensland 
who happened to drop into 
conversation that, he had 
scored a cameo role in Beverly 
Hills 90210. He was lying, of 
course, but faster than you 
could say “Luke Perry’s 
sideburns are, like, totally to- 
die-for”, he was having lim­
ousines, bodyguards, free 
passes to nightclubs and bev­
ies of blonde females pressed 
upon him.
It speaks volumes for the 
mentality of the Australian 
public. So much is made of 
the alleged Tall Poppy Syn­
drome in this country, but
what about the phenomenon 
of elevating completely ordi­
nary (and in many cases less 
than ordinary) people to the 
status of godhead?
Let’s call this species 
MUFFIES (Mostly Untal- 
ented Famous Folk) and mar­
vel at their achievements and 
their public profile, while 
carefully considering them for 
nomination for the Austral­
ian Of The Year. You may 
have your own favourites, but 
here for your edification and 
future dinner party argument 
fodder, is my Top 10 
MUFFIES OF 1992.
1. Elle Macpherson— 
Not only for that rivetting 
one hour special about the 
making of her Balinese calen­
dar. And not only for her wa­
tertight arguments detailing 
why she refused toappearnude 
in Playboy (at the time she 
was only wearing a bit of den­
tal floss on hernether regions). 
Mainly because of a comment 
she made last year which will 
endear her to educators for­
ever. Why doesn’t Elle have 
any books in her house? “Be­
cause I never read anything I 
haven’t written.” Role model 
ahoy!
2. Doug Mulray— I can’t 
understand why everyone’s so 
up in arms about the fact that 
he’s a sexist, racist, crass pig. 
Hasn’t anyone noticed his 
biggest crime ? He’s not funny. 
Even if you don’t admire Kerry 
Packer for anything else, at 
least he terminated Uncle 
Doug’s highly entertaining 
video show at the half-way 
mark.
3. Noeline Hogan—OK, 
OK, we’re sorry Paul left you 
for Linda Whatsemame. Now 
could you please slip out the 
back quietly?
4. Noelene Donaher— 
Did you know that this shy, 
reclusive woman from a mod­
est home in Sylvania Waters 
has had her life ruined by the 
media? She told us on the 
Midday Show, and on A Cur­
rent Affair, and in Woman's 
Weekly, and in TV Week, 
and...
5. The entire 1992 Aus­
tralian cast of Jesus Christ 
Superstar—Andrew Lloyd 
Webber may be to music what 
Jackie Collins is to the art of 
the novel, but at least you 
could come away from the 
originalJCS saying“nice sets". 
A  bunch of overpaid pop stars 
wandering around a stage 
while singing pap does not a 
spectacle make.
6. Athol Guy and Karen 
Knowles—Wouldn’t you like 
to be j udged seriously on New 
Faces by the bespectacled bass 
player from The Seekers and 
high profile (and hey, what 
have you been up to for the 
last 10 years, Kaz?) former 
juvenile from Young Talent 
Time?
7. Tony Barber—No,
honestly, Jeopardy is a com­
pletely new concept that’s 
never been seen on TV be­
fore. And no, rumours that 
I’m not overly versatile are 
completely exaggerated.
8. Molly Meldrum—An 
inspiration to us all. Who said 
you have to know anything 
about music to be the 
rock’n’roll guru of a country?
9. Daryl Somers—The 
leer of a used car salesman, 
the personality of a commer­
cial FM radio jock, and a 
stuffed animal as a sidekick. 
It all adds up to top ratings 
and great television.
10. Adriana Xenides— 
What do you mean “Who?"? 
She’s the one who spins the 
letters around on Wheel of 
Fortune, and., .um... well., .she 
spins the letters around on 
Wheel of Fortune, OK? ■
BARRY D IVOLA is a Syd­
ney journalist. Despite the 
fact that his work appears in 
Who Weekly, Drum Media, 
Hot Metal, Juice, HQ  and 
Qirlfriend, he is still not fa­
mous. He is quite bitter about 
this.
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A SLICE OF HISTORY
ALR is radically cutting back its stock of old issues. This is the last chance to catch up on many past issues 
you may have lost, given away or which preceded your subscription.
Back issues of most editions of ALR of the last few years are available, for $4.75 each plus p&p. The following 
list gives the major features of some of the more recent issues, to jog your memory. If you want older issues, 
or you’re not sure which issue you want, ring the ALR office on (02) 565-1855, and we’ll be only too happy 
to help.
No. 146, Dec 1992/Jan 1993: Clinton cover. The Liberals, the closed shop, Phillip Adams interviewed, 
Bill Clinton.
No. 145, Nov 1992: Jobsback! cover. The Coalition and industrial relations, bureaucrats, Meaghan 
Morris, Why save the environment?
No. 144, Oct 1992: Fist cover. Old and new conservatives, the continuing debt crisis, Richard Rorty, 
Sylvania Waters.
No. 143, Sept 1992: No Future? cover. Paul Hirst on the state, FredHalliday, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, 
Craig McGregor on Keating.
No. 142, Aug 1992: Asia cover. Asia supplement, the social market, prostitution, John Howard 
interviewed.
No. 141, July 1992: Earth summit cover. Green politics and modernity, Pat O ’Shane interviewed, LA 
riots, the Earth Summit.
No. 140, June 1992: Left Braindead? cover. South Africa, the UN, Barcelona, Is the Left Braindead? 
No. 139, May 1992: Keating raised from the dead cover. Police racism, the debt crisis, British Labour, 
Silence of the Lambs.
No. 138, April 1992: Freedom cover. Peter,Walsh interview, tax cuts, Russia’s collapse, One 'Nation. 
No. 137, March 1992: Royals cover. Keating and the vision thing, Eric Hobsbawm interviewed, Carole 
Pateman, the Royals.
No. 136, Feb 1992: Keating cover. Keating’s road to Damascus, selection in schooling, Fightback!
No. 135, Dec 1991/Jan 1992: Economic rationalism cover. Orthodoxy under siege, environment and 
industry, Stephanie Alexander and Tom Fitzgerald interviewed.
No. 134, Nov 1991: Medicare cover. Medicare co-payments, corruption, green trade, the Accord.
No. 133, Oct 1991: Campbell soup tin cover. Out of stock.
No. 132, Sept 1991: Bye Bye Gorby cover. The Soviet coup, Paul Hirst on East Europe, Pat Dodson, 
citizenship.
No. 131, Aug 1991: Pacific cover. Pacific feature, public ownership, Gorbachev and Madonna.
No. 130, July 1991: Life after Keating cover. Labor’s end of an era, NSW elections, women’s magazines, 
video culture.
No. 129, June 1991: Hewson cover. Lindsay Tanner on Labor, W A Inc, union crisis, India after Gandhi. 
No. 128, May 1991: Corporate Man cover. End of the free market decade, Telecom changes, the Third 
World, Tokyo.
No. 127, April 1991: Is Labor Dying? cover. Bob Hogg interview, public sector, Janet Powell and Nick 
Bolkus on the Gulf war, women and fitness.
No. 126, March 1991: Right to fight? cover. Gulf War debate, satanic child abuse, Sweden, Aboriginal 
sovereignty.
No. 125, Feb 1991: China cover. Out of stock.
We also have some copies of earlier issues of ALR, dating back to our first issue of 1966. For more info, 
ring our editorial office.
To order back copies:
Send $4.75 per copy, plus $ 1 per copy p&p, to ALR back issues, PO Box A247, Sydney South NSW  2000. Please 
send cheques or postal orders, or give us your Bankcard/Mastercard number, expiry date, and a signature. 
Discounts for bulk copies as follows: each copy above five copies = $3 per copy. Each copy above ten copies = 
$2.50 per copy.
Postage discounts as follows: for five to ten copies: postage = $5 total. For more than ten copies: postage = $7.50 
total.
If you’re not sure what your order should cost, just ask us to bill you.
C a m b r i d g e New books
Citizenship and Employment
Beyond the Protective State
The Political Economy of Australia's Manufacturing 
Industry Policy
BRIAN GALLIGAN and ANN CAPLING 
This book is an historical and theoretical account of Australia's 
transition from a protective to a corrective state. It gives a 
comprehensive analysis of the corrective policies of the Hawke 
government and presents case studies of three troubled manu­
facturing sectors: steel, motor vehicles and textiles, clothing 
and footwear. Beyond the Protective State makes a significant 
and timely contribution to writing on the Australian state and 
economic policy. It will prepare the way for debate as to how 
Australia might create a new political economy beyond the 
protective state.
1992 228 x 152 mm 272 pp 5 tables 2 line diagrams 
$27.50 Paperback 0 521 42629 4
$75.00 Hardback 0 521 41626 4
Criminal Law and Colonial Subject
New South Wales 1810-1830
PAULA J BYRNE
Paula Jane Byrne explores the relationship of a colonial people 
with British law and looks at the way in which the practice of law 
developed among the ordinary population. She traces the 
boundaries between property, sexuality and violence, drawing 
from court records, dispositions and proceedings, and asks: what 
did ordinary people understand by guilt, suspicion, evidence and 
the term ‘offence? This book reconstructs the legal process with 
great detail and richness and is able to evoke the everyday lives 
of people in colonial NSW.
1993 247 x 174 mm 301 pp 19 line diagrams 
$59.95 Hardback 0 521 40379 0
• Investigating  Post-Industrial Options
: JOP&YJi.EIXLEY - ;
•y ' t  i f  ■' ' r •? '
: Unemployment, re-emerged as a public issue during the
^ et f°r twenty years a chronic lack of jobs has 
’ accepted as an early symptom of the ‘post
’ “nUuS'tfial society’,r’A future. with permanently high levels of 
unemployment: Jocelyn Pixley's book is a reappraisal of the 
employment debate. It asks whether there is an alternative to 
wage labour that does not undermine citizens' rights and 
finds, from the various OECD governments that have al­
ready pursued this post-industrial strategy, that there is 
none. Citizenship and  Employmentblends a range of theoreti­
cal, historical and sociological approaches to a contentious 
issues facing all capitalist societies.
1993 228 x 152 mm 339 pp 1 line diagram 
$90.00 Hardback 0 521 41793 7 
$29.95 Paperback 0 521 44615 5
Shaping M elbourne's Future?
Town Planning, the State and Civil Society
J. BRIAN McLOUGHLIN
Shaping M elbourne’s Future? examines the effects of town 
planning on the shape and structure of the Melbourne metro­
politan area since the Second World War. It shows that 
Melbourne’s planners have seldom achieved their aims and 
relates urban development to the social and economic base 
which defines them, touching on the broader themes of 
history, sociology, geography and politics.
1992 247 x174  mm 261 pp 6 half-tones 26 tables 
$35.00 Paperback 0 521 43974 4 
$80.00 Hardback 0 521 41334 6
Cambridge University Press books are available from your bookseller. In case of difficulty, you may order direct from C.U.P., using this form 
Name: ____________________________________________________  Address: __________________________________________________
Postcode:
I enclose a cheque for $ 
Credit card expiry date _ 
Please send m e :____
or please charge $ . 
___Signature______
to my Visa*/Bankcard*/Mastercard* (‘ delete as appropriate) 
_____________________________There is no charge for postage.
C a m b r i d g e
UNIVERSITY PRESS
10 Stamford Road Oakleigh Victoria 3166
